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KHRG Photo Gallery 2010-B
The second installment[1] of KHRG's Photo Gallery 2010 includes 95 still photographs selected from images taken by KHRG field researchers since December 2009. Of these photos, 50 were taken between December 2009 and March 2010, and 45 were taken between April and July 2010. Photos were taken in Papun, Nyaunglebin, Toungoo, Mergui/Tavoy, Pa'an and Dooplaya districts of locally-defined Karen State, as well as at sites on the Thai side of the Thailand – Burma border. This edition of the gallery has been divided into six subsections: Establishment of Border Guard Forces and strategic displacement; Involuntary repatriation of refugees in Tha Song Yang District; Surviving with dignity beyond military control; Life under military control; Livelihoods under strain; Landmines; and Children in armed conflict. KHRG is committed to documenting not just the way that villagers are victims of human rights abuses, but also the myriad protection strategies they employ to resist abuse as well as maintain cultural practices and continuity in their lives. Consequently, all sections of this report include a wide variety of photo selections, not just photos of villagers as victims. Since the last photo gallery was released, KHRG has continued to document patterns of abuse consistent with those presented in earlier editions. Villagers already under government control continue to report abuses related to attempts by the Tatmadaw, Burma's state army, and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) holding ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw such as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) to consolidate control and support ongoing militarization of the countryside. Elsewhere, Tatmadaw forces continue efforts to expand control of territory and civilian populations, particularly in upland areas in northern Karen State. Though the Northern Karen State Offensive ended in 2008, military attacks on villagers in hiding, and their means of survival, nonetheless continue.[2] According to the most recent figures, more than 70,000 villagers remain displaced and in hiding in northern Karen areas, of whom more than 28,000 have been displaced or re-displaced within the past year;[3] between August 2009 and July 2010, at least 95 more villages were destroyed, relocated or abandoned.[4] In 2010, disagreements between the Tatmadaw and some sections of the DKBA over the latter's absorption into the Tatmadaw as Border Guard battalions also increased insecurity for villagers in Pa'an and Dooplaya districts in central Karen State, as civilians worried that open conflict would return to the region.[5] Despite the many challenges to civilian security and livelihoods, however, villagers in eastern Burma continue to show bravery and resilience, employing a range of strategies to protect their families and communities from abuse and the effects of abuse. Photos included in the Photo Gallery are identified with alphanumeric characters shown below each image. To view the first instalment of KHRG’s Photo Gallery 2010, click here. All photos are by KHRG except where otherwise noted. Terms and Abbreviations
Establishment of Border Guard Forces and strategic displacementIn early 2009, Burma's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) authorities initiated the final stages of a plan to press non-state armed groups in Burma's border regions that had previously signed ceasefire agreements with the SPDC to either disband and form legal political parties to contest the 2010 national elections, or else transform themselves into "Border Guard Forces" under more direct authority of the Tatmadaw, Burma's state army.[6] An April 28th 2009 directive issued by the SPDC instructed ceasefire groups to begin the transformation process;[7] on May 7th 2009, commanding officers stated in a high-level meeting of Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) officers at DKBA headquarters in Myaing Gyi Ngu, Pa'an District that the group would commence its transformation.[8] Negotiations and internal DKBA disagreement about the extent of integration into the Tatmadaw, however, continued for more than a year, with several deadlines for formal transformation passing.[9] In June 2010, a 'final' transformation deadline of August 10th 2010 was declared along with threats of armed force for non-compliance, and Na Kha Mway, the commander of DKBA forces variously referred to as Battalion #907, 'Klo Htoo Baw', and 5th Brigade, indicated that troops under his command would not join the BGF with other DKBA factions.[10] On July 22nd Na Kha Mway formally rejected the BGF proposal, and tensions between Tatmadaw and non-complying DKBA forces further escalated amid speculation that Tatmadaw forces might attack and attempt to arrest Na Kha Mway, possibly in a joint-operation with those DKBA forces that had decided to cooperate with the BGF plan. On July 25th, more than 600 villagers in northeastern Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District began to flee from their villages to Thailand's Phop Phra District in anticipation of an imminent Tatmadaw attack on Na Kha Mway's forces in the area.[11]
Involuntary repatriation of refugees in Tha Song Yang DistrictBetween January and April 2010, villagers from Pa'an District that had been taking refuge at temporary sites in Tha Song Yang District of Thailand's Tak Province were ordered to leave the sites and return to Burma by Thai army officials. The refugees had begun fleeing increased conflict and exploitative abuse in their villages in Lu Bpleh and Dta Greh townships, Pa'an District in June 2009, when State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Army and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) troops staged joint attacks on three Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) camps near the Ler Per Her camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Dta Greh Township. The villagers had primarily been hosted in three temporary sites in Tha Song Yang District: Nong Bua, Mae U Su and Mae Salit.[14] At the end of January 2010, Royal Thai Army (RTA) officials announced their intention to repatriate the refugees, stating that the area from which the refugees had fled was now safe for their 'voluntary' return. Although the assertion that returns would be voluntary was disputed by the verbal testimony of numerous villagers and by local civil society and humanitarian groups, the first three families were returned on February 5th. Though no further groups were forced into boats and returned to Burma that day, RTA soldiers maintained consistent pressure on refugees to return, including repeatedly telling them it was safe to return, restricting access to humanitarian services, and harassing residents of the sites. By April 1st 2010 the Nong Bua and Mae U Su sites – which in January had hosted 2,409 refugees – were empty after their inhabitants had gradually submitted to the two-month-long campaign of harassment and pressure by RTA soldiers.[15]
Surviving with dignity beyond military controlTatmadaw practices appear to be designed to depopulate areas of eastern Burma over which consolidated military control is difficult to establish, particularly upland areas. The well-documented pattern of abuses faced by civilians attempting to remain beyond military control suggests that these practices continue to be widely utilized. Where possible, civilian populations of such areas are forcibly relocated to areas that can easily be controlled – and tapped for material support in the form of finances, labour and materials – by Tatmadaw forces, usually in lowland territory or along established roads. Communities attempting to avoid relocation, and their livelihoods, are then targeted through practices that foster high levels of human insecurity in order to render areas beyond military control effectively uninhabitable. Abuses documented in such areas by KHRG include both willful and indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including women and children; attacks and other measures targeting food production and the food supply; the destruction of property essential to civilian survival, including the heavy deployment of landmines in areas essential to civilian livelihoods; and the active obstruction of humanitarian assistance, in particular food, medicine and health services to such areas.[16] Despite the security and humanitarian challenges faced by civilians inhabiting areas beyond consolidated military control, large civilian populations continue to hide in such areas, employing a range of self-protection strategies in order to avoid forced relocation or SPDC Army attacks. Such 'strategic' displacement entails a range of protection measures employed by individuals and communities to ensure adequate preparation for displacement; advance warning of threats; secure removal of all family or community members to a different location; and collective survival for the duration of displacement, including addressing problems related to physical insecurity, restricted movement and constrained access to land, food and health services.[17]
The attack on Tha Dah Der villageOn July 23rd 2010, soldiers from Tatmadaw LIB #370 under Battalion Commander Soe Myint Tun and based at Maw Poo camp in Lu Thaw Township attacked Tha Dah Der village in Tay Mu Der village tract, northern Lu Thaw Township, Papun District. The soldiers shelled more than 41 mortar rounds into Tha Dah Der before entering and setting fire to buildings, destroying villagers' property including water containers, agricultural tools, rice stores and livestock. The unit slept one night in the camp and continued burning buildings in the village the next morning, before returning to their camp at Maw Poo. A KHRG field researcher reported that 34 out of 58 households in Tha Dah Der were burnt down, as was the village church and school. Approximately 600 residents of Tha Dah Der fled to Tha Oh Der, joining approximately 300 other villagers from nearby communities that feared attacks.[20]
Life under military controlThe majority of Karen areas in eastern Burma are controlled by the Tatmadaw and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) that have ceasefire agreements with the Tatmadaw. Villagers in controlled areas must contend with a variety of abuses that appear to be related to attempts by these armed groups to consolidate and entrench military authority over lowland areas by improving military infrastructure, as well as systems of civilian control and resource extraction, to support the substantial military presence active in the area. Extractive abuses by Tatmadaw and ceasefire NSAG forces documented by KHRG include various forms of arbitrary taxation and ad hoc demands for financial and material support, as well as demands for various forms of forced labour including: fabricating and delivering building materials; construction and maintenance of roads; portering; forced recruitment into military service; guide, sentry, and 'messenger' duty; construction of army camps, fences, schools, libraries and clinics; and forced agriculture. Demands for forced labour are typically backed by implicit or explicit threats of violence by the issuing authority.[21] KHRG's research strongly indicates that the forced extraction of significant financial, material, and labour resources from civilian populations under control of Tatmadaw and ceasefire NSAG forces is an established, widespread practice throughout eastern Burma. Military personnel who engage in these practices do not appear to be punished or otherwise held accountable for their actions, suggesting that the practice of Tatmadaw units supporting themselves via local extraction is ignored or tacitly condoned, if not explicitly mandated in policy.[22] Extractive demands require villagers to divert crucial time, energy and resources away from their own, typically subsistence, livelihoods. KNLA forces also remains active in some areas under Tatmadaw or ceasefire NSAG control, staging guerrilla-style attacks and placing landmines and booby traps.[23] In response, villagers are frequently placed under tight movement restrictions, with those violating the restrictions risking fines, detention, being shot on sight outside villages or at checkpoints, and abuse as suspected KNU/KNLA members or supporters. Individuals suspected of communicating with or supporting the KNU/KNLA may face detention and questioning, as well as fines, torture, the destruction of their property and enforced disappearance. Movement restrictions restrict the amount of time villagers can spend at their agricultural projects or engaged in livelihoods activities, such as trade or daily labour outside their home village, exacerbating the strain on livelihoods and food security caused by exploitative abuse. It is important to note that rural villagers employ a variety of strategies to minimise or avoid complying with exploitative orders and other abuses. These strategies range from simple requests for reductions in 'taxation' quotas or an alleviation of movement restrictions, to aggressive challenges for military personnel to withdraw their demands. Utilising firsthand knowledge of and experience with local military personnel – and repression – local villagers are often skilled at discerning how much or how little space exists to oppose particular abuses. Strategies which villagers employ in areas under the consolidated control of the Tatmadaw or ceasefire NSAGs include, amongst other techniques complaints and negotiation; bribery or payment of 'fines' to avoid fulfilling a demand, including negotiations to reduce payments; lying; refusing; confronting; seeking intervention or mediation from alternate mutually-recognised authorities or respected figures; various forms of discreet partial or false compliance; and evasion.[24]
Livelihoods under strainMost families and communities in rural eastern Burma engage in subsistence livelihoods requiring high inputs of labour, time and resources. In addition to these already difficult circumstances, however, villagers must struggle on a daily basis to retain control over land and the freedom to pursue livelihoods activities; as the Tatmadaw and other non-state armed forces seek to control the civilian population, a number of military practices undermine villagers' control over their land and livelihoods. In areas beyond permanent military control, these practices are oriented towards making such areas uninhabitable for civilians and include: staging military attacks on villagers engaged in farming activities; forcibly relocating accessible civilian populations away from land; sending patrols to pre-burn damp fields to prevent a complete burn; deploying landmines in agricultural areas; and destroying paddy and other crops and paddy storage facilities. Restrictions on humanitarian support to communities in such areas, including military attacks on support providers, mean that villagers are in many cases entirely dependent on acutely constrained livelihoods activities. In mixed administration or areas of consolidated military control, including relocation sites, practices are oriented towards control of and extraction of resources from civilian populations and include: a range of forced labour demands that divert time and resources from civilian livelihoods; arbitrary taxation on trade and small-scale industry; and movement restrictions that geographically and temporally constrain villagers' livelihoods activities. The tension between military practices and civilian efforts to pursue livelihoods severely undercuts the human security of communities across eastern Burma. Consequences include widespread and persistent economic insecurity and cyclical household indebtedness, food shortages and high rates of malnutrition, and a range of health vulnerabilities. In the face of such direct challenges to their livelihoods, villagers have responded by adopting supplementary occupations, migrating in search of work, hiding food storage bins in the forest, and operating small covert hill fields and 'jungle' markets in order to evade restrictions and harmful practices of the Tatmadaw and other armed groups seeking to consolidate or expand control of civilian populations.
Destruction of villagers' agricultural projects
LandminesLandmines are used extensively by the Tatmadaw and all non-state armed groups active in eastern Burma, and pose a range of threats to civilians. Tatmadaw, DKBA and KNLA forces, and sometimes villagers themselves, use landmines on roads, paths and around camps and villages in shoot-on-sight areas, as well as in some mixed-administration areas. None of these actors have the capacity to comprehensively map and de-mine contaminated areas when camps are vacated or mines are no longer needed. State and non-state armed groups have also used landmines to control movements by the civilian population, particularly between mixed-administration and shoot-on-sight areas. In areas where these forces have attempted to expand control or drive populations into lowland relocation sites, landmines have been placed in abandoned villages to prevent return by villagers in hiding. Landmines have also been used to prevent access to agricultural land for villagers in hiding, and to prevent villagers from leaving forced relocation sites or returning to abandoned villages and agricultural land. Landmines are not always clearly marked, nor are communities always warned of new dangerous landmine areas. The Tatmadaw appears to have shared landmines with the DKBA, which has placed these landmines in civilian areas without providing warnings to local communities. KHRG has also documented incidents of DKBA and Tatmadaw soldiers using civilians to clear landmines, as well as forcing civilians to walk in front of patrols to trigger mines, booby-traps or ambushes laid by KNLA. Civilians have been forced to clear brush and debris from roadsides known to be mined by all parties to the conflict, an activity which amount to de facto dangerous and involuntary mine-clearance. Unexploded remnants of war remain a significant threat to civilian populations, particularly children, in many parts of eastern Burma.[29]
Children in armed conflictIn April 2008, KHRG released the report Growing up under militarisation: Abuse and agency of children in Karen State, which documented the situation for children in Karen areas, where they must contend with a variety of difficult circumstances related to armed conflict. In January 2010, KHRG released another report on the situation for children in Karen areas. Titled Grave Violations: Assessing abuses of child rights in Karen areas during 2009, the report concluded that grave violations of children's rights increased during 2009. It is important, however, to emphasise that children, and their communities, are not passive victims. Though this section does include photos of child victims, it is primarily made up of photos depicting the ways that children and their families respond proactively to abuse, including by taking measures to seek greater physical security for family members and working together to strengthen livelihoods and food security , even in the face of great adversity.
Footnotes[1] For the first installment of our 2010 photo gallery, containing 131 photos taken since July 2009, see: KHRG Photo Gallery 2010, KHRG, June 2010. [2] A comprehensive account of the situation in one township of northern Karen State is available in: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010. [3] Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) figures from a survey that is conducted annually to estimate the displaced population in conflict areas of eastern Burma. The survey is widely recognised as the authoritative source of figures for civilian displacement in the region. See: Protracted Displacement & Chronic Poverty in Eastern Burma/Myanmar, TBBC, November 2010, p.60. The figure of 70,100 civilians in hiding in northern Karen State was obtained at by adding TBBC's estimates for 'IDPs in Hiding' in Thandaung, Papun, Shwegyin and Kyaukkyi townships; these are SPDC-drawn administrative areas that approximately correspond to Toungoo, Papun and Nyaunglebin districts, which are Karen designations used by Karen villagers and KHRG. The figure of 28,110 civilians displaced in the past year was obtained by the same formula, using TBBC's figures for 'Population displaced in past 12 months.' Note that the figure of 70,100 displaced in northern Karen areas does not account for the 29,250 villagers in the same areas that are estimated to have been forcibly relocated from their lands and homes. [4] Protracted Displacement & Chronic Poverty in Eastern Burma/Myanmar, TBBC, November 2010, pp.61-62. Figure calculated as explained in footnote 3. [5] Since November 2010 these concerns have become reality as fighting has begun in Pa'an and Dooplaya; civilians in this context have expressed a range of concerns including physical danger from the fighting, abuse by armed groups and a limited capacity to deal with that abuse, disruptions to livelihoods activities, and problems accessing protection in Thailand. See: "Displacement Monitoring: Regular updates on protection concerns for villagers in Dooplaya District and Tak Province," KHRG, February 2011. [6] See McCartan, B., "Democracy plan fuels war in Myanmar ," Asia Times Online, February 25th 2009. The move to disarm or bring ceasefire armed groups under direct authority or the national armed forces, or Tatmadaw, can be traced to Article 338 of the 2008 Burmese constitution which stipulates that "All the armed forces in the Union shall be under the command of the Defense Services [Tatmadaw]." See, Ministry of Information, "Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (2008)" English version, Chapter VII Article 338. [7] Myanmar: Towards the Elections, International Crisis Group, August 20th 2009, p.14. [8] Leaked minutes of the May 2009 are retained by KHRG on file. For more background on the DKBA's decision and steps to become a Border Guard Force, including a reported upsurge in forced recruitment to increase the DKBA's troop strength to 9,000 soldiers in accordance with the BGF plan, see: "Forced recruitment of child soldiers: An interview with two DKBA deserters," KHRG, August 2009. [9] Deadlines were pushed back in October 2009, December 2009, February-March 2010, and June 2010, when a 'final' deadline of August 10th 2010 was declared. See: "Will the BGF Deadline Delay the Election?" The Irrawaddy, March 3rd 2010; "Junta Extends BGF Deadline for DKBA," The Irrawaddy, June 9th 2010. For more on internal fissures in the DKBA regarding BGF transformation, see: "Pro-junta Karen militia 'splits'," Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), May 3rd 2010. [10] "Junta Extends BGF Deadline for DKBA," The Irrawaddy, June 9th 2010. In August and September 2010, ceremonies attended by Tatmadaw commanders officially announced the transformation of large portions of the DKBA into a Border Guard Force. See, "Border Guard Forces of South-East Command formed in Paingkyon of Kayin State," New Light of Myanmar, August 22nd 2010; "Border Guard Force formed at Atwinkwinkalay region, Myawaddy Township, Kayin State," New Light of Myanmar, September 2010. [11] See "DKBA commander's defiance nudges Karen State towards war," DVB, July 26th 2010; "Villagers Flee in Fear of Attack on DKBA," The Irrawaddy, July 26th 2010; "Karen people welcome Brigade (5) decision on BGF," Karen Information Center (KIC), August 9th 2010. [12] The Thai village of Muh Luh Chah is also known as Thay Baw Boh in Karen, not to be confused with Thay Baw Boh village located in the adjacent area of Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District. [13] See especially: "Displacement Monitoring: Regular updates on protection concerns for villagers in Dooplaya District and Tak Province" KHRG, February 2011. [14] Note that Nong Bua and Mae U Su are the Thai names for sites referred to in Karen as Noe Boh and Oo Thu Hta, respectively. [15] For a step-by-step account of the circumstances of the refoulement of Tha Song Yang refugees, see: "Functionally Refoulement: Camps in Tha Song Yang District abandoned as refugees bow to pressure," KHRG, April 2010. [16] For a comprehensive account of SPDC Army practices in areas beyond consolidated military control, and the resulting humanitarian impact on civilian populations, see generally: Self-Protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010; also: Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review: Human rights concerns in KHRG research areas, KHRG, July 2010. [17] For analysis of protection strategies employed by villagers in hiding in upland northern Karen State to address physical security, livelihoods, health and education challenges during displacement, see: "Self-Protection under strain", KHRG, August 2010. [18] Further details on this incident can be found in "Attacks and displacement in Nyaunglebin District," KHRG, April 2010; "Children Shot and Killed by the Burma Army," FBR, March 2010; "Follow-up story: to story of Children Shot and Killed by the Burma Army," FBR, March 2010. [19] For more on protection strategies utilized by communities in hiding in northern Karen State, see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in Northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010. [20] The attack on Tha Dah Der was first reported in English by the Free Burma Rangers; see: "FBR REPORT: Burma Army burns villages and chases over 900 people into the jungle, attacks continue in Northern Karen State," FBR, July 2010. [21] See: Supporting local responses to extractive abuse: Commentary on the ND-Burma report 'Hidden Impact', KHRG, September 2010. An overview of extractive practices confronted by villagers is available in: Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, KHRG, November 2008, pp.40-76. This overview also describes additional forms of forced labour not listed above, such as mandatory attendance at meetings. See also: Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review: Human rights concerns in KHRG research areas, KHRG, July 2010. [22] The Tatmadaw's consistent reliance on forced extraction of resources, labour and material support from the civilian population has been referred to as the 'live off the land' or 'self-reliance' policy by KHRG as well as respected scholars of Burma's military history. Andrew Selth, for example, dates the policy to 1997, when Burma's War Office reportedly issued an order instructing the country's Regional Commanders that troops "were to meet their basic logistical needs locally, rather than rely on the central supply system." See, Andrew Selth, Burma's Armed Forces: Power Without Glory, Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2002 p. 136. See also, Mary Callahan, "Of kyay-zu and kyet-zu: the military in 2006," pp. 36-53 in Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson (eds.), Myanmar: The State, Community and the Environment, Canberra: Asia Pacific Press, 2007 p. 46. [23] The KNLA formally adopted the use of guerrilla tactics in 1998 at a military conference in Mae Hta Raw Tha, Dooplaya District. See, Ashley South "Ethnic politics in Burma: States of conflict," New York: Routledge, 2009 (2nd ed.), p.56. [24] For more on these strategies, see; Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, KHRG, November 2008; Supporting local responses to extractive abuse: Commentary on the ND-Burma report 'Hidden Impact', KHRG, September 2010. [25] For further background on the situation in Toungoo District, see: "Attacks on cardamom plantations, detention and forced labour in Toungoo District," KHRG, May 2010; "Forced labour, movement and trade restrictions in Toungoo District," KHRG, March 2010. [26] For more on food insecurity in eastern Burma, and particularly in northern Karen State, see: Food crisis: The cumulative impact of abuse in rural Burma, KHRG, April 2009; Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010. [27] Full details on this incident are available in "SPDC shelling destroys villagers' rubber plantations in Dooplaya District," KHRG, May 2010. [28] For more on the destruction of cardamom plantations in Toungoo, see: "Attacks on cardamom plantations, detention and forced labour in Toungoo District," KHRG, May 2010. [29] For further information on landmine use by all parties in Karen areas, see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010; Submission for the UN Universal Periodic Review: Human rights concerns in KHRG research areas, KHRG, June 2010; Grave Violations: Assessing abuses of child rights in Karen areas in 2009, KHRG, January 2010; "Insecurity amidst the DKBA – KNLA conflict in Dooplaya and Pa'an Districts," KHRG, February 2009. Landmine Monitor's 2009 country report for Burma notes that the Tatmadaw, DKBA and KNLA all manufacture and use landmines widely, and that "every township" of Karen State is hazardous for civilians; see, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, Landmine Monitor, 2009, pp.1029-1040. [30] Further information on the incidents in Wo--- village is available in: "Villagers injured by landmines, assisted by neighbours in southern Toungoo," KHRG, October 2010. [31] Gher der or 'home guard' groups have been organized locally in parts of northern Karen State threatened by Tatmadaw operations targeting civilians, and the resulting acute food insecurity. Villagers interviewed by KHRG have reported that gher der were established with the objective of providing security for communities of civilians in hiding , particularly when those communities engage in food production or procurement activities, and when other modes of protection are unavailable. For more on the gher der see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010, especially pp.88-95. [32] For more on Tatmadaw military practices that entail targeting of civilians in northern Karen State, see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010, especially pp.88-95. [33] See especially: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010, pp.73-81. [34] For more on factors undermining food security among displaced communities in northern Karen State, see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses in northern Karen State, KHRG, August 2010, pp.52-63. |
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