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Protection concerns expressed by civilians amidst conflict in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts
Civilians continue to be at risk of conflict and conflict-related abuse in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts as fighting continues following new hostilities between the Tatmadaw and DKBA. Fighting since November 7th 2010 has caused the largest single exodus of refugees fleeing to Thailand in more than 12 years. Villagers attempting to protect themselves inside Burma, as well as villagers already seeking refuge in adjacent areas in Thailand, have described to KHRG a variety of concerns: instability and continued armed conflict, as well as risks related to increased militarization including the functionally indiscriminate use of mortars and small arms in civilian areas, arrests, reprisals, sexual violence and forced labour portering military equipment. An Appendix containing 18 full transcripts of these interviews is also available on the KHRG website. Until their concerns are addressed, civilians in Dooplaya and Pa'an will continue need support that facilitates their protection from acute harm, including the option of temporary refuge in Thailand.
Civilians in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts continue to be at risk due to conflict between Burma's state army, the Tatmadaw, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), as well as other armed Karen groups in the area. Troop movements and the significant reinforcements sent to the area by the Tatmadaw, as well as statements made by all parties to the conflict, indicate that the situation remains highly unstable. Villagers continue to have serious protection concerns including instability and continued armed conflict, as well as risks related to increased militarization including the functionally indiscriminate use of mortars and small arms in civilian areas, arrests, reprisals, sexual violence and forced labour portering military equipment. In spite of attempts by civilians to protect themselves and their livelihoods from harm, villagers from the area will likely continue to need to access protection in Thailand. Civilians in Dooplaya and southern Pa'an have lived with conflict for decades, but in recent years this had been confined to infrequent skirmishes between the Tatmadaw and the 6th Brigade of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA);[1] civilians mostly experienced conflict through frequent exploitative demands from a variety of state and non-state armed groups in the area, including the Tatmadaw, DKBA, KNLA and others.[2] Many communities in Dooplaya had become accustomed to negotiating this difficult, overlapping patchwork of armed actors, doing their best to survive in the face of abuse. Civilians' established strategies for managing life amidst a long-running low-intensity conflict[3] have recently been upended as tensions between the Tatmadaw and the DKBA have risen since some factions of the DKBA refused to transform into government-controlled Border Guard battalions. While a significant portion of the DKBA had agreed to this transition,[4] sections of the DKBA in Dooplaya had refused. This faction has been led by Na Kha Mway, who controls a force variously referred to by the names Battalion #907, 'Klo Htoo Baw,'[5] and 5th Brigade.[6] On November 7th 2010 DKBA troops under the control of Na Kha Mway entered Myawaddy Town, Pa'an District, during voting for Burma's first election in 20 years. Heavy fighting occurred in Myawaddy the next day as Tatmadaw soldiers attempted to retake the town, as well as farther south in Three Pagodas Pass Town, Dooplaya District. Fighting between the two groups led an estimated 12,000 refugees to flee Myawaddy and seek temporary refuge in the adjacent town of Mae Sot, in Thailand's Tak Province. At least 10,000 also fled Three Pagodas Pass, taking refuge in Thailand and in nearby territory controlled by the New Mon State Party,[7] which has thus far stayed staunchly neutral.[8] Both groups of refugees were larger than any single exodus of refugees since 1997. Fighting also occurred at the large village of Waw Lay, home to DKBA commander Na Kha Mway and located in Dooplaya District, approximately halfway between Myawaddy and Three Pagodas along the Thailand-Burma border. This fighting initially caused approximately 2,500 villagers from Waw Lay and nearby areas to seek refuge in Phop Pra District, Tak Province. Thai authorities began encouraging civilians fleeing fighting after the election to return as soon as Tuesday afternoon, and by Wednesday the majority of the refugees in Mae Sot and on the Thailand side of Three Pagodas Pass had returned to Burma, or gone into hiding. While many refugees returning from Mae Sot appeared to be doing so willingly, some villagers expressed a desire to stay in Thailand where they could safely monitor the security situation. Villagers seeking refuge from Wah Lay, however, expressed a very strong desire to remain in Thailand, given the high likelihood of continued conflict in the area around their homes. Thai authorities, however, forced many of them to return, though many subsequently returned and dispersed to quiet hiding places inside Thailand. As of November 12th 2010, a consortium of community organisations was providing support to 560 civilians remaining in the Mae Sot area and 1,025 civilians in Phop Phra. In order to understand continued threats faced by civilians in Dooplaya District approximately one week after fighting had driven large numbers of villagers to seek refuge in Thailand, KHRG conducted 22 interviews with civilians, both inside Dooplaya and Pa'an districts and at hiding sites in Thailand. The majority of these interviews were audio recorded; individual quotes have been included in the pages below, and full transcripts of 18 of these interviews are included as Appendices 1 and 2. The four interviews not included in the Appendices were excluded because they were not recorded by researchers operating under precarious security conditions. Protection concerns in conflict affected areasVillagers that spoke with KHRG highlighted three main protection concerns: 1) Risks directly related to the high likelihood of further fighting 2) Risks stemming from the unstable and evolving military context but not necessarily related to fighting between armed groups 3) Arrests, reprisals and forced portering 1) Risks directly related to the high likelihood of further fighting.Civilians interviewed by KHRG both in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts and in hiding in Thailand have described being afraid of being caught amidst fighting between armed groups, such as what occurred to civilians in Myawaddy and Three Pagodas towns on November 8th and 9th 2010. Civilians have been killed or injured in at least eight such incidents over the last week. Note that the following incidents should be taken as demonstrative of the threats faced by civilians, rather than a comprehensive casualty list:
Clashes between the Tatmadaw and Karen armed groups have continued. Villagers from Waw Lay village reported hearing six mortar explosions and small arms fire near their village starting at 6:40 PM on November 14th 2010. Villagers also reported an unknown number of mortars fired at Gk'Neh Lay village at 9 PM on November 14th 2010. While speaking to KHRG on November 15th, a source in KNU 6th Brigade, which is active in Dooplaya District, also reported that soldiers from KNLA Battalion #17 had attacked soldiers from Tatmadaw Light Infantry Division (LID) #22 just before the latter arrived in Kyaikdon Town.
Relations between the Tatmadaw and armed Karen groups are highly unstable, and the Tatmadaw appears to be reinforcing troops in Dooplaya District, particularly at Myawaddy and Three Pagodas Pass. According to the latest intelligence, 1,000 Tatmadaw troops are now at positions between Tha Song Yang, to the north of Myawaddy town, and Waw Lay to the south. A source in KNU 6th Brigade that requested anonymity, meanwhile, said that approximately 180 troops from LID #22 travelling in six trucks arrived in Kyaikdon Town on November 14th. Kyaikdon is situated at the intersection of a road leading to Three Pagodas Pass Town and another road that eventually terminates at Waw Lay. A DKBA Commander interviewed on November 14th, meanwhile, told KHRG that he expected continued fighting with the Tatmadaw, and explained the ways in which further conflict might occur, including as a response to reinforcements from LID #22:
A source at KNLA headquarters that spoke with KHRG on condition of anonymity on November 16th reiterated the belief that conflict in Dooplaya District would continue on either a low- or high-intensity scale:
In addition to the KNU/KNLA and DKBA, Dooplaya and Pa'an districts are home to other armed Karen groups including the Karen Peace Force (KPF) and the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army - Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC). Both groups have had relatively stable relations with the Tatmadaw since splitting from the KNU in 1997 and 2007, respectively. However, reports indicate that they have both joined fighting in the last week.[15] If these reports are true, the current fighting marks a radical re-orientation of military relationships in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts, as these four armed Karen groups have not cooperated extensively for as many as sixteen years and have, in some cases, been in conflict with one another as well.[16] Additional changes could occur if DKBA units that have agreed to become Border Guards decide not to support Tatmadaw operations, particularly if they began fighting in cooperation with the KNLA or factions of the DKBA under Na Kha Mway's control.
2) Risks stemming from the unstable and evolving military context
In addition to danger of being caught amidst conflict between the Tatmadaw and Karen armed groups, the re-orientation of military relationships and the increasingly unstable military context in Dooplaya and Pa'an Districts also threatens the security of civilians in the area. The escalation of hostilities in areas in which relatively limited fighting has occurred in recent years, and the presence of armed actors with whom villagers may be unfamiliar and thus uncertain how to interact, appears to have affected villagers' confidence in their ability to remain securely in their homes while armed groups are engaged in conflict nearby. Many villagers interviewed by KHRG based these fears on past experience with the Tatmadaw or with earlier periods of upheaval and increased conflict. In the following quote, for example, Naw Ag--- describes how she decided to flee based upon memories of conflict between the Tatmadaw and KNLA. In her quote she describes fears including forced portering and sexual violence:
Such flux threatens villagers in a number of ways. Armed groups new to a given area may place landmines to secure strategic positions or launch attacks without an awareness of - or regard for - which areas are frequently inhabited, transited, or used for livelihoods by civilians. The Tatmdaw, KNLA and DKBA all make extensive use of landmines. Two refugees that fled fighting in Ghaw Lay Kee in April 2009, for example, were injured by landmines on April 30th 2009 as they returned to check on their fields.[17] A lack of familiarity and confidence to interact with armed groups may also limit civilians' ability to access information about landmines and future attacks, and take according protection measures; one villager interviewed by KHRG even described being afraid to ask for information about the situation in his villages because the new armed group controlling his village - in this case the Tatmadaw - might accuse him of gathering intelligence for the DKBA and kill him. In the past, DKBA soldiers operating under Na Kha Mway have also burned huts or assaulted villagers accused of supporting KNLA soldiers, with whom Na Kha Mway was in conflict at the time.[18]
An absence of established relationships with local communities, or fear of changing military dynamics in an unfamiliar area, may also lead armed actors to fire recklessly, endangering civilian populations, or even to intentionally disregard the protection of civilians perceived to be sympathetic to an adverse party to the conflict. On November 12th, a villager in T--- village told KHRG that Tatmadaw battalions under Military Operations Command (MOC) #8 had shelled his and nine other nearby villages in Kawkareik Township. The villager reported that 20 mortars were fired at his village during the night on November 8th; 50-60 mortars were fired on November 9th over a longer period; and 139 mortars fired during almost the whole night on November 10th, from 5 PM to 3 AM. According to the villager, Tatmadaw troops were not firing at selected targets but were afraid because they had received reports that they would be attacked by a group of KNLA soldiers that had entered their area.[19]
Civilians interviewed for this report described mortars and other weapons fired with such lack of care as to amount to a functionally indiscriminate use of such weapons, including mortars landing deep in civilian areas. One villager who was particularly incensed during an interview with KHRG requested that the information he shared be publicised as widely as possible, as he hoped it would lead someone ask the Tatmadaw to explain why its forces had shelled his village. Such reports are supported by earlier documentation by KHRG, indicating that both the DKBA and Tatmadaw consistently fire without making attempts to distinguish civilian from military targets or and often fail to exercise precautions to ascertain the presence of civilians in areas selected for attacks in order to minimise civilian harm.
Two villagers from Waw Lay that spoke with KHRG in separate interviews on November 13th described an incident that is particularly illustrative of the danger to civilians posed by both the unstable security and military situation on the ground and the reckless use of weapons by soldiers in the area. On November 9th, Saw A--- and Saw Z---- attempted to travel by motorbike to retrieve food and belongings from another villager's house on the far side of a residential area in which DKBA soldiers and their families had lived until recently, located just east of Waw Lay village. As they passed through the area they realised, however, that it had been occupied by Tatmadaw soldiers.
Afraid because this development represented a major change in the military conditions in their area and because they did not know how they would be treated by the unfamiliar Tatmadaw soldiers, they tried to turned the bike around to flee. Before they had turned around, however, Tatmadaw soldiers began shooting at them with light weapons, and then fired two 'mortars' in their direction as they drove back into Waw Lay.
3) Arrests, reprisals and forced porteringCivilians interviewed while hiding in Thailand have also described worries related to civilians being arrested and accused of connections to the DKBA. This worry has not been limited to civilians with actual connections to the DKBA; villagers from Waw Lay interviewed by KHRG have explained that they fear reprisals from the Tatmadaw simply because they had been living in a village under DKBA control. As noted above, villagers have stated that they were afraid to seek information about the current military and security situation in their areas because they might be viewed as spies or informants, and killed. In the past, KHRG has also documented the extensive use of movement restrictions by Tatmadaw and DKBA soldiers attempting to cut off opponents from bases of civilian support.[20]
Fears like those described by villagers in Waw Lay appear to be supported by interviews with villagers in Myawaddy where, after fighting subsided, villagers have subsequently reported seeing relatives of non-Border Guard Force DKBA members being arrested and loaded into trucks, along with DKBA uniforms being burnt and weapons confiscated.
KHRG has for years documented the extensive use of porters by both the SPDC and DKBA. The use of forced portering typically increases during seasonal resupply operations, or during times of increased conflict, when large amounts of equipment need to be moved, sometimes over difficult terrain. KHRG documented this occurring during January 2009, for instance, when troops under Na Kha Mway's control forced villagers to carry DKBA soldiers wounded in fighting with the KNLA.[22] Given that both the SPDC and DKBA have made significant movements over the last week and will continue to do so, it is highly likely civilians will be at risk of forced portering. Comprehensive reports have not yet been possible, however villagers interviewed by KHRG in Myawaddy and inside Dooplaya District have reported the use of porters. On November 11th, for example, a civilian in T--- village, Kya-in-seik-gyi Township, said that the Tatmadaw was seizing male villagers in his area to be used as porters. The same villager told KHRG that male residents of his village had subsequently gone into hiding in nearby mountainous areas to avoid being taken as porters.
Civilian protection in conflict affected areasCivilians in areas affected by recent conflict between the Tatmadaw and DKBA have reported using a variety of strategies to try and protect themselves from acute harm. Some villagers have dug bomb shelters, and have told KHRG that they plan to flee only if fighting comes right to their homes. Others say they are monitoring the situation as closely as they can, and have made preparations to flee on short notice, including keeping bags packed with items necessary for survival during flight, and securing valuables by hiding them or transporting them to Thailand.
Villagers interviewed by KHRG made clear that they do not wish to go to Thailand, or remain in Thailand for an extended period, unless safety considerations absolutely require them to do so. Villagers say they are particularly worried that their possessions, their homes and farms will be looted while they are away. This concern is supported by interviews with villagers both in Waw Lay and Myawaddy, who have told KHRG that they, their relatives or their neighbours have had belongings stolen while seeking refuge in Thailand.
Villagers have also told KHRG that they are anxious to return before yet-to-be-harvested crops rot in the fields. Crops waiting to be harvested include paddy, corn and beans. Although some villagers have been able to find temporary employment as day labourers to support their families during displacement, if villagers are not able to return home in the near future, they risk losing their crops, which could have devastating consequences for food and livelihoods security in the coming months. This could contribute to further displacement, including to Thailand as economic migrants, as well as prove an obstacle to future safe return of refugees.[23]
In spite of reservations expressed by many villagers, and their attempts to protect themselves and remain in their home villages, it is highly likely that many civilians will continue to seek protection in Thailand in the immediate future. Temporary refuge will continue to be necessary until the situation stabilizes and until safe return according to internationally recognised standards can be organised. Every effort should be made to include civilians in any processes that determine whether, how, or how long they are hosted in Thailand, and under what circumstances they can safely return to their homes and lands in Burma. Footnotes[1] The KNLA formally adopted the use of guerrilla tactics in 1998 at a military conference in Mae Hta Raw Tha, Dooplaya District. See, Ashley South, Ethnic politics in Burma: States of conflict, New York: Routledge, 2009 (2nd ed.), p.56. [2] For details of exploitative demands and other abuses in Dooplaya District, see "Setting Up the Systems of Repression: The progressive regimentation of civilian life in Dooplaya District," KHRG, September 2006; "Dooplaya District: Fighting And Human Rights Abuse Still Continue After Ceasefire," KHRG, February 2005. [3] For further information on strategies used by civilians to protect themselves from abuses related to low-intensity conflict, see Village Agency: Rural rights and resistance in a militarized Karen State, KHRG, November 2008. See also, "Supporting local responses to extractive abuse: Commentary on the ND-Burma report Hidden Impact," KHRG, September 2010. [4] The DKBA, headquartered in Myaing Gyi Ngu in northwestern Pa'an District, is active across Pa'an, Papun, Thaton and Dooplaya districts, controlling lucrative revenue sources including timber, mining and border trade. In August and September 2010, Burma's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC ) military government held ceremonies to mark the transformation of complying factions of the DKBA into a Border Guard Force. See, Border Guard Forces of South-East Command formed in Paingkyon of Kayin State, New Light of Myanmar, August 22nd 2010; "Border Guard Force formed at Atwinkwinkalay region", Myawaddy Township, Kayin State," New Light of Myanmar, September 2010. [5] 'Klo Htoo Baw' translates as 'gold drum' in S'gaw Karen, and is a reference to the traditional drum seen at the centre of the Karen national flag. The Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM) reported in 2009 that Na Kha Mway left the KNU/KNLA in 1997 and became the commander of DKBA Battalion #907; in 2007 he was promoted to head four DKBA battalions (#901, #906, #907 and a security battalion) as the commander of the Klo Htoo Baw Tactical Command. See: "Power through gun barrels: Abuses related to the DKBA offensive in Dooplaya District," The Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM), April 2009. [6] By mid-November 2010, this split had fully hardened, with the non-Border Guard Force DKBA restructuring itself into ten battalions, promoting Na Kha Mway to the rank of major general. These battalions are divided into three units, active in Kawkareik and Kya In townships, Dooplaya District. See: "Junta offers reward for capture of Karen army leader, dead or alive," Bangkok Post, November 2010. [7] "Thousands flee from Three Pagodas Pass Town, support and basic supplies a concern," HURFOM, November 9th 2010 [8] "NMSP remains neutral in face of nearby fighting in TPP," The Independent Mon News Agency, November 2010. [9] "Thousands flee from Three Pagoda Pass Town," HURFOM, November 2010. [10] "Thousands flee from Three Pagoda Pass Town," HURFOM, November 2010. [11] "9 year old girl killed during fighting at Three Pagodas Pass," HURFOM (WCRP), Novmeber 10th 2010 [12] "KNU pounds Kyain-seikkyi with heavy weapons, leaving one civilian dead and another injured," New Light of Myanmar November 11th 2010. According to the villager that spoke with KHRG, shelling that injured villagers in Noh T'Gkaw came from troops under Military Operations Command #8. For more information on this incident, see the section titled "Risks stemming from the unstable/evolving military context," below. [13] "New Light of Myanmar," November 11th 2010. [14] "Civilians at risk from continued SPDC-DKBA conflict in Dooplaya District," KHRG, November 2010. [15] "Fighting Moves Karen Groups into Loose Alliance," Burma News International, November 2010. A KNU/KNLA-PC officer interviewed on November 12th told KHRG that the Tatmadaw was "tightening its grip" on his group and that checkpoints previously under KNU/KNLA-PC control in the area near its headquarters in Htaw Ko Ko, Pa'an District had been taken over by Tatmadaw soldiers. The officer also said that six KNU/KNLA-PC soldiers had been killed by Tatmadaw forces. [16] In April 2009, for example, the DKBA helped the Tatmadaw take control of an important camp belonging to KNLA #201 Battalion in Waw Lay Kee, Kawkareik Township, Dooplaya District. See, "Joint SPDC/DKBA attacks, recruitment and the impact on villagers in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts," KHRG, May 2009. [17] "Joint SPDC/DKBA attacks, recruitment and the impact on villagers in Dooplaya and Pa'an districts," KHRG, May 2009. [18] "Exploitative governance under SPDC and DKBA authorities in Dooplaya District," KHRG, July 2008; "DKBA soldiers burn down huts, detain villagers and loot property in Thailand," KHRG, January 2009. [19] These shells were attributed to the KNLA in an article published by the New Light of Myanmar; see: New Light of Myanmar, November 11th 2010. [20] "DKBA soldiers attack Karen village in Thailand," KHRG, October 2008. [21] The DKBA is primarily Buddhist, and Naw Af--- is emphasizing the widespread nature of Tatmadaw reprisals by saying that Christians will also be treated as DKBA supporters. [22] "DKBA soldiers burn down huts, detain villagers and loot property in Thailand," KHRG, January 2009. [23] For a discussion of the relationship between conflict, human rights abuses and 'economic' migration to Thailand, see Abuse, Poverty and Migration: Investigating migrants' motivations to leave home in Burma, KHRG, June 2009. Related Resources |
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