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Southern Papun District: Abuse and the expansion of military control
This report presents information on the human rights situation in village tracts along the southern end of the Ka Ma Maung to Papun road in southern Dweh Loh and Bu Tho townships. SPDC and DKBA units maintain control over strategic points in lowland areas of this part of southern Papun, including relocation sites and vehicle roads, and support their presence by levying a range of exploitative demands on the local civilian population. SPDC and DKBA forces also continue to conduct offensive military operations in upland areas of southern Papun; for villagers living beyond permanent military control, these activities entail exploitative abuses, movement restrictions and, in some cases, violence including military attacks. Communities in both lowland and upland areas employ a variety of strategies to protect themselves and their livelihoods from SPDC and DKBA abuses and the effects of abuse. Strategies documented in this report include negotiation; paying fines in lieu of compliance with demands; discreet semi- or false compliance, or overt non-compliance or refusal to meet demands; strategic displacement to areas beyond consolidated SPDC or DKBA control; and actively monitoring local security conditions to inform decisions about further self-protection responses. This is the last of four reports detailing the situation in Papun District's southern townships that have been released in August 2010. Incidents described below occurred between September 2009 and April 2010.
Battalions of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Army and Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) continue to maintain a strong military presence and exercise considerable authority in the village tracts of Dweh Loh and Bu Tho townships that sit astride southern Papun District's Ka Ma Maung to Papun vehicle road. SPDC and DKBA forces can project military force throughout much of Meh Nyoo, Meh Gkoo, Meh Mweh, and Meh Gklaw village tracts in Bu Tho Township, and Ka Dtaing Dtee village tract in Dweh Loh Township, but fully consolidated control of some upland areas has not been established. SPDC and DKBA authority is strongest over civilians residing in low-lying areas in the floodplain of the Yunzalin River and near strategic points where military units are regularly deployed, including SPDC and DKBA camps, locations along the Ka Ma Maung to Papun road and in SPDC or DKBA-controlled relocation sites. Major relocation sites in this area include: Ka Dtaing Dtee, Baw Kyoh Leh, Noh Paw Htee, Meh Mweh Hta, Pah Loh, and Meh Nyoo Hta in Papun District and Khaw Taw (Myaing Gyi Ngu) in Pa'an District (see map).[1] Units from Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) 5th Brigade also remain active in upland areas of southern Papun, staging irregular 'guerrilla' style attacks and placing landmines and booby traps in lowland areas.[2] In areas of southern Papun under firm SPDC or DKBA control, the human rights abuses reported by villagers are typically exploitative in character, as locally deployed units from these armed groups support themselves by extracting significant material and labour resources from the local civilian population. Villagers in these areas also face irregular violent abuse and implicit or explicit threats of violence, usually to promote compliance with exploitative demands and other orders issued by local military authorities. Locals interviewed for this report described heavy forced labour demands including: the fabrication and delivery of materials and the provision of other forms of material support to local SPDC or DKBA forces; portering SPDC and DKBA rations and equipment; service as messengers in military camps (set tha); involuntary labour clearing roadside brush; work on SPDC farms; building and maintaining houses for DKBA soldiers; labour in support of DKBA logging operations or other businesses; and forcible recruitment into the DKBA. Communities in areas subject to SPDC or DKBA authority also face movement restrictions which limit villagers' freedom of movement between their homes and agricultural projects, and constrain farming and other crucial livelihoods activities; individuals violating these restrictions risk death or injury from landmines or violent abuse if caught by SPDC or DKBA soldiers. In areas of southern Papun under firm SPDC or DKBA control, the human rights abuses reported by villagers are typically exploitative in character, as locally deployed units from these armed groups support themselves by extracting significant material and labour resources from the local civilian population. Villagers in these areas also face irregular violent abuse and implicit or explicit threats of violence, usually to promote compliance with exploitative demands and other orders issued by local military authorities. Locals interviewed for this report described heavy forced labour demands including: the fabrication and delivery of materials and the provision of other forms of material support to local SPDC or DKBA forces; portering SPDC and DKBA rations and equipment; service as messengers in military camps (set tha);[3] involuntary labour clearing roadside brush; work on SPDC farms; building and maintaining houses for DKBA soldiers; labour in support of DKBA logging operations or other businesses; and forcible recruitment into the DKBA. Communities in areas subject to SPDC or DKBA authority also face movement restrictions which limit villagers' freedom of movement between their homes and agricultural projects, and constrain farming and other crucial livelihoods activities; individuals violating these restrictions risk death or injury from landmines or violent abuse if caught by SPDC or DKBA soldiers. Villages in upland areas west and east of the Ka Ma Maung to Papun road and in the Yunzalin River valley, meanwhile, are under nominal but unconsolidated SPDC and DKBA control; efforts to expand military control of territory and populations via offensive military operations and forced relocation of civilians remain ongoing. Villagers in these areas reported confronting exploitative abuses such as forced portering and ad hoc demands or looting when SPDC or DKBA units are based near their homes. Upland communities also, however, reported heavy movement restrictions, risks from landmines, and violent abuses including attacks on their villages, killings and physical abuse of individuals detained on suspicion of having had contact with the KNLA. Villager accounts indicate that forced relocation - and the use of military force against civilian populations that attempt to avoid relocation - remains a key tactic for military forces attempting to extend their authority into southern Papun. Interviews with villagers and reports by KHRG field researchers indicate, however, that individuals and communities throughout southern Papun continue to employ a range of strategies to protect themselves and their livelihoods from human rights abuses and the harmful effects of abuse. Strategies of community self-protection described by villagers interviewed for this report appear to have been developed and employed according to local perceptions of protection threats, shaped by a number of factors that differ from village to village, including: the degree of SPDC or DKBA control in a given area; the character and intensity of abuses faced in a community; relationships between community members and local military personnel; and the extent to which abuses strain local food or financial resources and labour capacities, among other factors. Local protection strategies described by villagers appear to be primarily aimed at improving communities' physical security from violence or military attacks, and avoiding or reducing exploitative demands and other restrictions, and thereby securing access to labour, time and material or financial resources for local livelihoods. Protection responses described by villagers interviewed for this report include: negotiation with local military authorities; paying fines to avoid meeting demands; discreet semi- or false compliance, or overt non-compliance or refusal to meet demands; strategic displacement to areas beyond consolidated SPDC or DKBA control; and actively monitoring local security conditions to determine appropriate additional protection measures.
Abuses and the maintenance of SPDC and DKBA controlCommunities living in areas under consolidated SPDC and DKBA control in southern Papun face abuses from both dominant armed groups. In the following quotes, two village heads from village tracts in southern Bu Tho Township describe their experiences dealing with SPDC and DKBA units deployed near their villages:
In some cases, villages have faced pressure to meet demands issued by multiple SPDC or DKBA units operating out of different camps located near their communities. On November 17th 2009, for example, villagers in F--- village in Meh Gklaw village tract, Bu Tho Township, were ordered to provide bamboo poles for re-building the SPDC camp at Koo Seik, in Dweh Loh Township. Twenty villagers, 19 men and one woman, went to find and cut bamboo in the jungle, and then delivered the poles the camp at Koo Seik. On November 21st, residents of G--- and H--- villages were also ordered to cut and deliver 100 bamboo poles to the Koo Seik camp; 17 villagers spent the day completing the work. This was not the first time villages in these areas were forced to fabricate and deliver materials to the SPDC camp at Koo Seik; in the quote below Naw C---, the headwoman of F---, described having to fulfil the exact same demand as those described above.
In a similar incident, on February 3rd 2010 village heads in Meh Nyoo village tract in Bu Tho Township were ordered by SPDC commanders to instruct their villages to each fabricate and deliver 300 thatch shingles to the SPDC camp at Htwee Thee Uh,[5] in Dweh Loh Township. On February 5th villages that could not avoid the order began delivering the thatch to Htwee Thee Uh camp. I--- village in Meh Nyoo village tract is already an SPDC relocation site in which SPDC and/or DKBA units are regularly based; these units impose their own additional demands on villagers in the area and frequently restrict villagers' travel to their agricultural projects and surrounding villages. KHRG's most recent information indicates that in 2010 a unit from SPDC LIB #702 led by Captain Phyo Way Ko Ko replaced a unit from SPDC LIB #219 at Htwee Thee Uh; it is not clear, however, whether the order to fabricate thatch was issued by SPDC LIB #702, or local SPDC or DKBA commanders in I---.
In Ka Dtaing Dtee village tract, which lies on both sides of Ka Ma Maung to Papun road on the western bank of the Yunzalin river in southern Dweh Loh Township, villagers face heavy demands for forced labour due to strong SPDC, and particularly DKBA control of the area. Residents of villages in Ka Dtaing Dtee village tract have described being forced to provide food, thatch, bamboo and firewood to local military units; to provide villagers as porters and minesweepers, and as labour constructing bridges, DKBA camps, and houses and toilets for DKBA families; and, in at least one case, to provide labour and materials for the personal business of a DKBA soldier. In such heavily controlled areas, strategic flight or outright refusal to meet SPDC or DKBA demands for forced labour or the provision of material support are often not available options for villagers seeking to protect themselves from the harmful effects of abuse. Instead, communities and their leaders employ more subtle strategies to reduce demands, and thus mitigate the impact of those demands on delicate rural livelihoods. One strategy reportedly utilised is to comply with a given SPDC or DKBA forced labour demand, but to supply less than the requested amount of labourers, thereby freeing up one or two villagers to pursue their livelihoods and provide for their families, and perhaps cooperate to support the livelihoods of those required to perform labour. In the following quotes, three long-serving village heads from Ka Dtaing Dtee village tract describe the range of regular human rights abuses they and their communities face, and the balance they must strike between seeking to mitigate those abuses on the one hand, and not incurring punishment by local authorities on the other.
Abuse and the expansion of SPDC and DKBA controlSince most villages and relocation sites under SPDC or DKBA control in southern Dweh Loh and Bu Tho townships are in close proximity to upland areas over which military control has not been fully established, civilians in southern Papun are also impacted by SPDC and DKBA attempts to expand into new areas. Beginning on September 8th 2009, as the annual rainy season drew to a close, SPDC and DKBA units initiated offensive operations in the village tracts along the southern end of the Ka Ma Maung to Papun road. SPDC units from LIB #219 under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Soe Win and DKBA units from Battalion #666 and Gk'Saw Wah Special Battalion #777 were reportedly involved in the campaign. Residents of S--- village, Bu Tho Township told a KHRG researcher that approximately 130 soldiers in total were active in Meh Mweh, Meh Nyoo, and Meh Gklaw village tracts, and that civilians living in areas beyond state control were attacked by patrols and with indiscriminate shelling. As of September 16th the interviewees said that 300 villagers had already fled from Meh Nyoo village tract deeper into upland areas, to avoid military attacks or forced relocation by SPDC and DKBA troops. Villagers living in areas in or adjacent to the areas of increased military activity had to confront demands for forced labour and for the provision of material support, especially food, whenever soldiers entered their villages; some villages faced additional demands for forced recruitment issued by DKBA officers. These villages were also placed under tight movement restrictions; residents caught in violation of these restrictions risked being shot on sight, regardless of whether they had been informed about the new regulations. On September 11th 2009 a column of 40 DKBA soldiers led by Commander Saw Ba Yoh rotated from T--- village to U--- village. They ordered six residents of U--- to serve as messengers (set tha) each day for the week that they stayed in the village: a total of 42 villagers for the week. On September 17th this DKBA unit rotated again to G--- village, where they were joined by 20 soldiers from SPDC LIB #219. The SPDC and DKBA commanders called a meeting with the villagers when they arrived, during which they ordered G--- to provide seven villagers to perform set tha each day, a total of 56 labourers for the eight days that the columns remained in the village. The villagers were forced to collect firewood, carry water, and collect bamboo shoots and mushrooms for the soldiers to eat. On September 24th the soldiers reportedly looted ten chickens belonging to residents of G--- village; U K--- (male, 40) and Saw L--- (male, 43) each had two chickens taken, while U M--- (male, 43) lost six chickens. When the SPDC and DKBA units left the village later in the day on September 24th, the seven villagers from G--- sent for set tha that day were ordered to porter military supplies back to I--- village. After arriving in I---, the soldiers ordered six villagers per day for set tha, and demanded five big tins of rice (80 kg. / 176 lb.) and six chickens from the residents of the village. The SPDC and DKBA columns remained in I--- until September 30th, during which time they sent smaller patrols into the surrounding villages; these units made additional ad hoc demands on the communities they visited. V--- village, for example, was ordered to provide two big tins of rice (32 kg. / 70 lb.). On September 25th, one chicken, one goat, and one duck were taken from three villagers in W--- village by a patrol of ten DKBA soldiers led by Saw Hsa Wah (aka Pah Lo). On September 27th, a larger patrol demanded an additional five big tins of rice (80 kg. / 176 lb.) from G--- village. On September 30th 2009, the SPDC LIB #219 and the DKBA troops again left I--- to return to the SPDC camp at Htwee Thee Uh, demanding seven villagers to porter their equipment and rations. At least one villager was killed during September 2009 while being forced to serve as a porter for the DKBA. On September 24th, a patrol of ten DKBA Gk'Saw Wah Battalion soldiers ordered the headman of T--- village, Saw N--- (male, 40), to porter supplies between X--- and Y--- villages in Bu Tho Township. Before arriving in Y--- village the group encountered a KNLA patrol and exchanged fire; three DKBA soldiers were wounded in the clash, and Saw N--- was shot and killed. DKBA forced recruitmentIn addition to demands for messengers and forced porters, DKBA units active in September 2009 also attempted to forcibly recruit for military service residents of the communities they entered. On September 14th DKBA Gk'Saw Wah Battalion #777 officers based in I--- issued an order to a meeting of village leaders, instructing villages in Meh Gkoo, Meh Nyoo and Meh Gklaw village tracts to provide villagers to serve as DKBA soldiers. Villages were ordered to send one or two villagers to meet the recruitment order, depending on the size of each village. If villages were unwilling or unable to provide soldiers, they were told they would have to pay a fine of 1,500,000 kyat (US $1,530)[6] for each soldier that could not be provided. On September 17th DKBA soldiers visited G--- village to collect their recruits, and the village leader was able to successfully negotiate a payment of 600,000 kyat (US $612) for each demanded soldier instead of providing villagers. On September 19th, DKBA Commander Ba Yoh demanded that I--- village provide its quota of soldiers; again, the village leaders were able to negotiate the demanded sum down from 1,500,000 kyat (US $1,530) to 600,000 kyat (US $612) per recruit. Z---, Ba--- and Ca--- villages also reportedly each paid 600,000 kyat (US $612) instead of sending one of their community members to serve in the DKBA. The DKBA's September 2009 forced recruitment campaign also extended south to Ka Dtaing Dtee village tract in Dweh Loh Township, on the western bank of the Yunzalin River.
DKBA movement restrictionsWhile the SPDC and DKBA units were conducting offensive operations in September 2009, some villages were reportedly placed under tight movement restrictions by soldiers active near their homes. Villagers risked being shot on sight, injured by landmines, or detained and subjected to violent abuse as suspected KNLA supporters if caught violating the restrictions.
On September 11th 2009, a group of 40 soldiers from DKBA Battalion #666 led by company Commander Saw Tin Win entered Ha--- village at approximately 3 am. Ha--- is located in Meh Gkoo village tract, Bu Tho Township, and has been under SPDC control since 1995. At 5 am the soldiers spotted Saw R---, a 45-year-old resident of Ha--- village, as he was going to work on his farm in violation a movement restriction that had been imposed on the village. Saw R--- was shot and fell to the ground, having been wounded in his left side. Commander Tin Win reportedly picked up Saw R---'s flashlight and beat him with it until he died.[7] Later that day, Tin Win ordered the head of Ha--- village, Saw S--- (male, 39) to meet him. When Saw S--- arrived, he was beaten and punched in the head by Tin Win without being asked any questions. The next day, on September 12th 2009, the unit continued its movement and arrived in X--- village, Bu Tho Township. Outside the village, they encountered Saw T---, a villager in violation of the movement restrictions; platoon commander Pah Dah reportedly kicked and beat Saw T--- with his rifle. On September 17th 40 soldiers from DKBA Battalion #777 led by company commander Gkaw Pee arrived in Ja--- village, Bu Tho Township, to collect forced recruits that the village had previously been ordered to provide. While there, Saw U--- (male, 35) and V--- (male 53), two residents of Ja---, were accused of communicating with the KNLA, detained, and punched in the face and kicked by DKBA soldiers. It is not clear on what grounds the men were accused of having made contact with the KNLA, although statements made by villagers in the area indicate that they men may have been caught in violation of a movement restriction. The fact that they received public, summary punishment, however, suggests that the men were beaten as an example to other villagers, to instil fear and promote compliance with future DKBA orders and restrictions.
On September 19th 2009 soldiers from a combined SPDC and DKBA force consisting of 70 soldiers on patrol in D--- village, Bu Tho Township, shot and killed Saw X---, a deaf and mute 19-year-old villager, when he failed to respond to soldier who called to him. The SPDC troops were from LIB #219 and under the command of So Htun, while the DKBA unit was from DKBA Battalion #666 and commanded by Saw Tin Win. Saw X--- was returning to D--- village from tending his buffaloes with another villager, described to KHRG's field researcher as the mother of Naw Y---, when they were spotted by one of the patrolling soldiers. When Saw X--- did not respond to the soldier's call, he was shot, at which point he attempted to run towards D--- and away from the gunfire. Naw Y---'s mother shouted to the soldiers that they were just villagers, but more soldiers opened fire. Saw X--- was struck with five bullets and wounded in both his legs and his head; he died after reaching the school compound in the village. A relative of Saw X--- described the incident to a KHRG field researcher, including the compensation offered by Commander So Htun.
Increased landmine risksAll armed groups active in Papun's southern townships make extensive use of landmines. Villagers interviewed for this report, however, placed particular emphasis on recent operations by the DKBA, reporting that DKBA forces had laid a large number of landmines prior to and during their period of increased activity in September 2009. On September 28th 2009, a KHRG researcher accompanied local Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO)[8] militia members during the removal of a DKBA landmine in Tha Bluh Hta village. The next day, in Gklaw Hta village, they removed two more landmines laid directly in front of the village school and beside a path leading to the school.[9] In the following quote, a deserter from DKBA Battalion #666 described the extent of the DKBA's use of landmines in areas in which it is active.
The DKBA's practice of not informing villagers of where landmines have been placed appears to reinforce movement restrictions on civilians. Villagers interviewed by KHRG researchers have reported that DKBA soldiers have mined their agricultural projects and abandoned villages, restricting or preventing civilian access; interviewees said that, if they were warned about the landmines, they were only informed about general areas that had been mined and instructed to avoid them altogether, regardless of whether or not they had land under cultivation in the newly restricted areas. When enforced in this manner, movement restrictions can be far more devastating to livelihoods than simple written or verbal orders backed by the threat of detention and/or summary punishment. In the latter case, villagers can attempt to covertly violate prohibitions on visiting their fields and carry out vital agricultural activities despite the increased physical risk involved in doing so; this approach is particularly viable in areas where DKBA or SPDC soldiers rotate in and out of villages, and residents actively monitor and share information about troop movements. When DKBA units deploy landmines around villages and in villagers' plantations and fields, however, without telling locals where mines have been placed, individuals must risk death or injury to engage in everyday livelihoods activities without knowing the locations of mines or else give up whatever labour, financial and material resources they have invested in their agricultural projects.
Protection of communities through strategic displacementFlight has been utilised by some individuals and communities living along the southern end of the Ka Ma Maung to Papun road as a protection strategy against SPDC or DKBA abuses. DKBA logging operations in 2009 in Meh Mweh village tract in Bu Tho Township, for example, exacerbated the strain of regular forced labour demands on the livelihoods of local communities, prompting some villages to flee to other areas in an effort to avoid abuse and the impact of abuse on their livelihoods. Local residents described being forced to cut and carry trees for no remuneration for the DKBA soldiers engaged in logging; having to meet other regular forced labour demands such as set tha; and being placed under movement restrictions that severely limited their access to their lands and thus their ability to carry out livelihoods activities. In at least one case where a community was able to successfully negotiate with local DKBA soldiers to refrain from imposing movement restrictions, landmines placed by the troops continued to prevent the community from engaging in livelihoods activities, prompting the village to follow the example of several other communities in the area and go into hiding. The threat to local communities and livelihoods posed by DKBA logging activities does not appear to have abated: KHRG's field researchers reported that on April 9th 2010, a group of DKBA Battalion #666 soldiers led by Commander Pah Na Dee set up camp and began patrolling in Ra--- village with the intention of expanding their logging activities there.
A number of villagers in hiding that have spoken with KHRG have echoed the statement above that DKBA or SPDC forced relocation orders strongly influenced their decisions to flee to areas further from military control. Villagers resist forced relocation orders for a number of reasons. Most villagers in rural communities in Karen State depend on agricultural activities on lands near their village for families' survival, and relocation means separation from these lands and a familiar way of life. Excessive forced labour demands and movement restrictions imposed on villagers in relocation sites make it extremely difficult for villagers to access their plantations and farms with sufficient frequency to carry out regular livelihoods activities on old lands; the SPDC and DKBA practice of mining villages and fields after residents have been evicted also makes return to collect or cultivate previous resources exceedingly dangerous. Relocation sites are furthermore typically unlivable for the majority of villagers, as they receive little or no food support from local authorities and have little time to find, prepare, and cultivate new land due to heavy exploitative demands and movement restrictions, if sufficient cultivable land is even available near the site. In the first quote below, Na---, a villager who fled from his home to avoid a DKBA relocation order, explains his decision to go into hiding. Na---'s wife died just ten days after giving birth to their second child, who also later died; he had wanted to take her to a clinic for the delivery, but DKBA movement restrictions prevented them from travelling to the medical facility. In the following quotes, villagers describe how they pre-emptively fled relocation orders to avoid living under military control.
ConclusionThis is the fourth report focusing on the situation in Papun District's southern townships that has been released during August 2010.[10] These four reports make clear that the practices of SPDC and DKBA forces form consistent, abusive patterns depending on the local politico-military context. In areas where military control is high, and there is low risk of evasion by civilian populations or attack by the KNLA, abuses documented in this report appear to be most commonly related to extracting support from the civilian population, including through: forced labour; demands for material or monetary support; and conscription. In areas where control is weaker, however, and the risk of evasion by civilian populations and/or attack by the KNLA increases, abuses related to the extraction of support by SPDC and DKBA forces are augmented by abuses related to enforcing control of the population and preventing attack. Abuses most commonly reported include: restrictions on movement and trade; curfews; placing unmarked landmines in civilian areas, often without warnings; and violence related to accusations of support for the KNLA or reprisals following KNLA activity. In areas in which SPDC or DKBA control is less consolidated or non-existent, villagers report more extreme military practices, including: direct attacks on civilians, such as shooting villagers on sight or remote shelling; mining or destroying fields, food stores and civilian settlements; and restrictions on access to humanitarian support.[11] In all of the contexts described above, civilians bear the brunt of what is ostensibly a conflict between state and non-state armed groups. Civilian populations appear to be viewed by dominant armed actors as inextricably linked to the conflict, as a resource and labour pool to be drawn from, and as a potential support base that opponents must be prevented from accessing. In some cases these objectives are enforced with extreme violence. In spite of considerable obstacles, villagers interviewed for these four reports described using a variety of strategies to reduce abuse or its harmful effects, including: negotiation; paying fines in lieu of compliance with demands; and discreet semi- or false compliance, or overt non-compliance or refusal to meet demands. In contexts where the threat of violence prevented the use of such strategies, or where households or entire communities felt they could no longer survive in the face of abuse, villagers interviewed by KHRG described using displacement strategically, fleeing in order to temporarily or permanently evade further abuse by armed groups. That communities and their leaders in Papun's southern townships are sometimes able to reduce or avoid exploitative demands, despite the strong military presence near their homes and the omnipresent threat of violence to enforce compliance with orders, testifies to the bravery and creativity with which villagers respond to protect themselves against threats to their security and livelihoods. These local concerns and priorities, and the strategies employed to address them, should be acknowledged, respected and supported. Local actors are best able to assess the obstacles and threats they face, including protection concerns, and formulate appropriate responses. External actors wishing to promote human rights in eastern Burma should thus seek detailed understandings of these activities and the concerns and priorities that inform them. Such nuanced understandings are necessary for developing practical support that broadens villagers' range of feasible options for responding to abuse and the effects of abuse. Footnotes[1] This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. See: "Wholesale Destruction: The SLORC/SPDC Campaign to Obliterate All Hill Villages in Papun and Eastern Nyaunglebin Districts," KHRG, February 1998; "Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, " TBBC, October 2004, p.69; "Damming at Gunpoint: Burma army atrocities pave the way for Salween dams in Karen State," Karen Rivers Watch, November 2004, p.37. Although not located in Papun District, the DKBA headquarters at Khaw Taw (Myaing Gyi Ngu) has served as a major relocation destination for villagers from the village tracts of southern Bu Tho Township since the mid-1990's. See: "SLORC / DKBA Activities: Northern Karen Districts," KHRG, July 1995. [2] For examples of KNLA units targeting SPDC roads and road construction operations in other parts of Bu Tho Township, see: "SPDC and DKBA road construction, forced labour and looting in Papun District," KHRG, March 2009. The KNLA formally adopted the use of guerrilla tactics in 1998 at a military conference in Mae Hta Raw Tha, Dooplaya District. See, Ashley South Ethnic politics in Burma: States of conflict, New York: Routledge, 2009 (2nd ed.), p.56. [3] Set tha; Forced labour as a messenger stationed at army camps or bases and serving as a go-between to deliver orders from army officers to village heads, but also involving other menial tasks such as cooking, collecting water and cutting firewood. [4] Loh ah pay; a Burmese term now commonly used in reference to forced labour, although traditionally referring to voluntary service for temples or the local community, not military or state projects. [5] For more examples of incidents involving soldiers based in Htwee Thee Uh camp, see "Central Papun District: Abuse and the maintenance of military control," KHRG, August 2010. [6] All conversion estimates for the kyat in this field report are based on the fluctuating informal exchange rate rather than the SPDC government's official fixed rate of US$1 = 6.5 kyat. As of August 30th 2010 this unofficial rate of exchange was US$1 = 980 kyat, and this figure is used for all calculations above. [7] This incident has been mentioned in a previous KHRG report; see: "Starving them out: Food shortages and exploitative abuse in Papun District," KHRG, October 2009. The report cited a Karen Information Center (KIC) news bulletin. KHRG has since received its own, more current, information about the incident, as reflected in the description above. The previous reports did not specify the name of the DKBA commander or unit that perpetrated the act, and only stated that Saw Htoh Gkee had been shot and killed. [8] The KNDO is the militia wing of the KNU. [9] The incident of the mines placed in front of Gklaw Hta school was previously reported by KHRG. See: Grave Violations: Assessing abuses of child rights in Karen areas during 2009, KHRG, January 2010. [10] See also, "Central Papun District: Village-level decision making and strategic displacement," KHRG, August 2010; "Central Papun District: Abuse and the maintenance of Military Control," KHRG, August 2010; "Southwestern Papun District: Transitions to DKBA control along the Bilin River," KHRG, August 2010. [11] For more details on deliberate attacks on civilians by SPDC Army forces in areas of Papun where control is at its lowest ebb, see: Self-protection under strain: Targeting of civilians and local responses, KHRG, August 2010. Related Resources |
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