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Without Respite: Renewed Attacks on Villages and Internal Displacement in Toungoo District
Examining the Motives behind the OffensiveMany journalists and Burma watchers who have been commenting on the current situation in Karen State have been claiming two things: firstly, that the full-scale military offensive now underway in northern Karen State is a conflict that is being bitterly waged between government troops and Karen rebels and that the thousands of newly displaced villagers are all fleeing from the fighting; and secondly, that the offensive is a security measure being undertaken by SPDC forces related to the recent relocation of the national capital from Rangoon to Pyinmana in Mandalay Division. These assertions need to be explored further. The first of these misconceptions that needs to be examined is the belief that the present offensive is a counter-insurgency operation aimed at hunting down and crushing the Karen resistance: the KNU and its armed wing the KNLA. This belief leads to published statements like "the [SPDC] military and ethnic Karen rebels have been locked in fierce combat since February". [15] There has not been any "fierce combat". Admittedly, there have been sporadic clashes, but nothing that would amount to the "fierce combat" suggested. In fact, the only fighting that has occurred in Toungoo District so far this year has been when the KNLA has ambushed an advancing SPDC Army column in order to give internally displaced villagers in the area a chance to get away, or whenever an SPDC or KNLA unit has unwittingly stumbled across the other, leading to a brief firefight before one of the groups retreats. With several thousand SPDC Army soldiers now in the region the KNLA, far outmanned and outgunned and forced to adopt guerrilla tactics to harass SPDC Army patrols, stand no chance in a stand-up fight. Their role in Toungoo District, if not in most of Karen State, is now more to protect the villagers and slow the advance of approaching SPDC Army patrols, giving the internally displaced an opportunity to flee to safer territory. Furthermore, SPDC units do not presently, nor do they typically, actively seek out and engage the KNLA. If SPDC soldiers receive word of a KNLA unit nearby, their tendency is to actively avoid them. The current offensive, like most over the past ten years, involves the SPDC Army directly targeting unarmed Karen civilians, not the armed combatants of the KNLA. The villagers are therefore not fleeing from fighting between others, but rather are fleeing because they are the target of these attacks. All of the attacks seen thus far during the current offensive have been mounted against villages and the hiding sites of the internally displaced, not KNLA soldiers or camps. A KHRG field researcher from the region has said, "As the SPDC junta has increased their activities, the number of villagers fleeing has also increased. Regardless of whether the villagers would regularly encounter the SPDC Army soldiers or not, more of them are fleeing to Thailand. It is not because of warfare, but because their rights have been violated and they couldn't endure it any more". These sentiments were echoed by a KNLA officer in Papun District who told KHRG, "[n]ow the SPDC has come up to burn houses and kill villagers. They're not here to shoot KNLA soldiers". The majority of SPDC Army officers stationed in Karen State are more interested in using their time there to exploit and terrorize the population and line their pockets with money extorted from the villagers than they are in fighting a war. The internal displacement that we are seeing growing almost daily is being caused not by a war between two armed forces, but by the human rights abuses that are targeted directly at the villagers themselves. By evading SPDC military columns and refusing to comply with orders, the villagers pose more of a threat to local and regional SPDC power than the KNLA. The regime therefore sees them as the enemy, and attacks them and their means of sustenance in its attempts to subjugate them. The KNLA is only one expression of how Karen people resist this subjugation; most of their resistance takes the form of nonviolent noncooperation, like ignoring orders calling for forced labour, bribing military officers, or fleeing into the forest to evade SPDC control.
Another common claim regarding the current offensive is that it is in some way linked to the relocation of the capital to Pyinmana. On May 3 rd 2006, Thai English-language daily The Bangkok Post quoted Sop Moei District superintendent Police Colonel Suthep Thaphanaworakul saying of newly arrived refugees that, "these people are coming to the border because Burma's government has forced all ethnic Karen living within five kilometre[s] of their new capital, Pyinmana, to clear out. They are afraid construction on the capital will be sabotaged by ethnic rebels, such as the KNU [Karen National Union ]". [16] It is highly unlikely, however, that the move to Pyinmana is a significant factor in this offensive. The first and most obvious reason for this is simple geography: Toungoo District is approximately 100 kilometres (60 miles) south of Pyinmana and villages now being attacked in Nyaunglebin and Papun Districts are even further away (see Map of Burma). The KNLA has no operations at all any closer to Pyinmana. If the SPDC's objective, as suggested above, is to secure a five kilometre radius surrounding Pyinmana, it would seem more logical to focus its military resources on that area rather than sending thousands of troops over 100 kilometres away to attack forces who have no operations near the new capital. Even if we accept this as a logical 'pre-emptive strike', we should be seeing similar attacks in the northern tip of Toungoo District, which is much closer to Pyinmana, and against areas of Karenni (Kayah) State and Shan State where the Karenni Army (KnA) and Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) are operating, which are the same distance from Pyinmana. But such attacks are not occurring. The present offensive in northern Karen State is no more related to the move to Pyinmana than is the increased pressure being placed upon ceasefire groups to disarm, renewed restrictions being imposed upon international NGOs working within the country, the adjournment of the SPDC's constitution-drafting national convention, the imposed "retirement" of NLD politicians, or the ongoing detention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. All of these are simply displays of an exceedingly paranoid and hard-line regime trying to hold on to power at all costs. The Free Burma Rangers (FBR), in their April 29 th 2006 report, Relationship of the Offensive to the Move to the New Capitol [sic] of Pyinmana, stated that the attacks that we are seeing "are a continuation of the yearly attacks, and are part of an ongoing 50 plus year attempt to crush the resistance and control the people". [17] That same report quoted a Karen relief worker from the region to have said that, "This is a bad year and maybe [it] will be as bad as 1997 or worse, but this is all part of their plan to control the people and destroy any who disagree with their orders." The SPDC has long sought to gain control over Toungoo District. It is a region which they have never been able to effectively control, and the regime appears to have decided that they can bring more civilians under their control with yet another major offensive against villages.
The SPDC has taken full advantage of the protective shield provided by their informal ceasefire with the KNU since January 2004. They have used this time to expand and improve their networks of roads and establish new military camps in areas where previously there were none; both through the use of forced labour. All of these camps, the newly built and the existing ones alike, have been fully stocked with food, supplies, and munitions, again through the use of the forced labour of villagers. This has occurred not only in Toungoo District, but throughout Karen State. The SPDC exploited the freedom of movement enabled by the ceasefire, moving into areas where they were previously unable to go for fear of being ambushed by the KNLA. KNLA soldiers have largely been unable to repel the SPDC expansion, many of them frustrated by the orders to observe the ceasefire and not to engage with the SPDC. The ceasefire has thus allowed the SPDC to gain a foothold in areas that have traditionally been controlled by the KNU and this has provided them with a unique springboard from which to launch the current offensive. Much larger offensives in 1997 destroyed thousands of villages throughout a much wider area, and similar but smaller offensives were mounted against civilian villages every year from 1998 to 2003, burning villages and displacing villagers, but the media and most of the international community has ignored them. Just because the international media is taking notice for the first time, they assume that this must therefore be a new phenomenon, and seek its causes in other current events – hence the assumption that it must be related to Pyinmana. But this is not new; it has been standard SPDC practice for ten years. It would appear that everyone who is claiming a relationship has also overlooked the simple fact that this offensive, having begun in November last year, commenced at the same time as every other SPDC dry season offensive mounted annually in Karen State. There are many distinct similarities between what is occurring now and what has happened in past offensives. In 2002, the SPDC launched Operation Than L'Yet in Dooplaya District in southern Karen State (see Operation Than L'Yet: Forced Displacement, Massacres and Forced Labour in Dooplaya District, KHRG #2002-U5, 25/9/02). During the six months from January to July 2002 in which this offensive took place, the SPDC forcibly relocated approximately 60 villages, more than half of which were destroyed, and an estimated 10,000 villagers were displaced. Villages were fired upon with small arms and shelled with mortars. Once relocated or abandoned, villages were looted and then either partially or completely burned down by SPDC Army soldiers. Rice barns were also looted and burned. Most villagers, faced with little other option, chose to go to the relocation sites as ordered by the soldiers. Aside from the easternmost stretches along the Thai-Burma border, the open terrain of most of Dooplaya District offered little in the way of places to hide. Those villagers who did flee into these forests were hunted by SPDC Army patrols throughout the wet season. The SPDC planted many landmines and maintained a very heavy military presence along the border to block those attempting to flee to Thailand. In spite of this, over 1,300 refugees arrived at Noh Poe refugee camp in Thailand, and Thai military authorities at the time had estimated that a further 4,700 were hiding in the forests not far from the border, waiting for an opportunity to bypass the SPDC soldiers and cross over. All of this, however, was taking place at the same time that the SPDC was building up international anticipation that they would soon release Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, who was eventually released in May to international jubilation. The SPDC, adept at playing on the international media and its infatuation with the charismatic democracy icon, knew full well that all media attention would be focused on Daw Suu, thus creating an impenetrable smokescreen behind which they could hide their activities in Dooplaya District (see also KHRG Commentary #2002-C1, 26/9/2002, which details the almost exact correlation between the lead-up to the release and the build-up of the offensive). It is possible that the SPDC engineered the current offensive much in the same way as they did Operation Than L'Yet. Perhaps they thought that they would be able to conduct their operations in Karen State with impunity while the world focused on the sudden relocation of the capital to Pyinmana. If this was indeed their plan, it clearly failed, and failed terribly. Ironically, the only reason that the world has taken notice of this year's Karen offensive is because some journalists interested in Pyinmana began to claim that there was a relationship between the two events. Had those journalists not believed in that connection, the world would as usual not have paid any attention. When the Pyinmana smokescreen backfired on them, SPDC leaders found themselves having to deny that any offensive was underway in Karen State. They have instead repeatedly referred to any military activity as "security measures" and "cleaning-up operations" in areas where "terrorist insurgents" were believed to be hiding. On May 14th 2006, SPDC Information Minister Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan admitted to the offensive, stating that:
Labelling the KNU as "terrorist insurgents" vindicates the SPDC for any offensives conducted in any of the areas in which the KNU operates. All such operations can then be conveniently dismissed as "counter-insurgency" and any abuses committed against civilians during these operations as "collateral damage". The SPDC has long employed this policy quite successfully as a means of sidestepping international condemnation. Unsurprisingly, the SPDC has levelled blame at the KNU for the recent spate of bombings in and adjacent to Karen State, claiming that the KNU has been responsible for 13 separate bombing attacks since November 2005 [19]; an allegation that the KNU denies. Two obvious questions arise: firstly, why would the KNLA, an impoverished army with over 50 years experience fighting a much larger and better equipped force, plant small ineffective explosives in markets, schools, or other such locations of no strategic importance? Secondly, why is it that there have not been any explosions thus far that have caused any real damage to any SPDC infrastructure or personnel? All bombs that have allegedly been planted close to any SPDC installation have either been reported by "duty conscious people" and disarmed before detonating, or if they have detonated, have been too small to cause any substantial or critical damage. It appears far more likely that the SPDC are planting the bombs themselves in order to strike terror into the hearts of the people living there so that they may be lulled into the belief that continued military rule is necessary for the stability of the nation, and to justify offensives against villagers in Karen State. If the SPDC is indeed responsible, as the evidence suggests, this would not mark the first time that the military junta has employed such a strategy. In 2003 at Depayin, a large gang of assailants attacked a motor convoy carrying Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, reportedly killing dozens of her escort and violently beating others. Daw Suu escaped unharmed, and the attack was later reported as being organised by the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), an SPDC-sponsored group often used for such operations. After organising the attack, the SPDC used it as an excuse to return her to house arrest "for her own safety." Similarly, in the speech quoted above SPDC Brigadier General Kyaw Hsan clearly suggests that SPDC troops are burning villages, shooting villagers on sight and landmining their ricefields "to protect the lives and property of the people." Meanwhile, the SPDC has once again begun playing the "Suu Kyi card" to distract attention from the offensive. It is possible that the SPDC may try to repeat its 2002 success by using exactly the same tactics and relying on the international community's deliberate amnesia. Its extension of her detention on May 27th 2006 is no surprise, because SPDC tactics are always to do something very bad before doing something slightly good: that way the 'good' action looks much better, and draws more international support. For example, the SPDC always extends prisoners' sentences shortly before releasing them in order to be credited with releasing them 'early', and in 2002 it was vilifying Daw Suu in the media just before releasing her 'early'. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Under-secretary-general Ibrahim Gambari have already joined this public relations campaign, promising SPDC Senior General Than Shwe that they will try to get more money for him if he releases Daw Suu, [20] stating to the world that the SPDC is ready to "turn a new page", [21] and all the while Annan does not even mention the Karen offensive in any of his statements. In a recent report, KHRG explored the possibility that the impending construction of a number of hydroelectric power plants in or near the offensive area may be part of the impetus for the attacks that we are seeing now. "By destroying all hill villages and forcing villagers to sites under direct SPDC control, the dam environs and access routes would be 'secured' and the villagers would become available for exploitation – primarily to provide forced labour, food, materials and extortion money to support the troops sent in to secure the dam access routes, but possibly also on the dam projects themselves". [22] KHRG has identified no fewer than six proposed dams that are all located very close to areas in which the offensive is taking place in Toungoo, Nyaunglebin, and Papun Districts. [23] While these projects cannot explain the geography of some parts of the offensive (for example the attacks in southeastern Toungoo District), it is probable that they provide at least part of the motivation behind the offensive. Overall, the main motivating factors behind the offensive appear to include a combination of the unprecedentedly hardline approach of the regime at present, the access to Karen areas secured under the ceasefire, the desire to secure lucrative dam and infrastructure projects, and most of all the need felt by a paranoid regime to bring the life and livelihood of every civilian in Burma under its direct and daily control. In its implementation, this offensive is another step in the SPDC's ongoing efforts to depopulate the hills and force all villagers into areas which the Army can more effectively control, where they can then be exploited as a source of forced labour and extortion to support the continuation of military rule. The villagers, however, are once again refusing to submit, evading the Army and getting their story to the outside world. The SPDC strategy may be failing, but it is inflicting extreme suffering on the civilian population and this war of attrition must be forced to stop through whatever means necessary.
Footnotes[15] Agence France Presse. " Burma must halt offensive against minority rebels: UN rights experts", 17/5/06. Received by email. [16] The Bangkok Post. "More Karen flee junta's 'slave labour'", 3/5/06. [17] Free Burma Rangers. "Relationship of the Offensive to the Move to the New Capitol of Pyinmana". 29/4/06. Received by email. [18] New Light of Myanmar (online version). "Government not in favour of war that it is taking security measures. As KNU has been time and again jeopardizing and harming the lives and property of the people, the Government has to take security measures. KNU drove out the people to prevent them from contacting Tatmadaw and to displace them. Large number of rural people lose lives and limbs due to booby traps of KNU", 15/5/06. Accessed at: http://www.myanmar.com/nlm/enlm/May15_h1.html on 16/5/06. [19] The New Light of Myanmar (online version). "Atrocities committed by KNU in Southern Command area", 15/5/06. In the article, the KNU is blamed for 13 separate bombing attacks between November 2005 and May 2006. Accessed at: http://www.myanmar.com/nlm/enlm/May15_rg5.html on 16/5/06. [20] Los Angeles Times. " Myanmar extends Suu Kyi's arrest", 27/5/06. Received by email. [21] Agence France Presse. " Myanmar may be paving way for Suu Kyi's release: UN", 23/5/06. Received by email. [22] Karen Human Rights Group. Toungoo District : Update on the dam on the Day Loh River. May 30th 2006 ( KHRG #2006-B5). [23] The Thaukyegat dam project on the Day Loh River in western Toungoo District, the Bawgata (Baw Ka Hta) Hydropower Project and the Shwe Kyin (Shwegyin) Hydropower Project in Nyaunglebin District, and the Weh Gyi, Dagwin, and Hat Gyi dam projects on the Salween River in Papun District. |
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