Abuse Under Orders

An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group
March 27, 2001 / KHRG #2001-01

[Some details in this report have been omitted or replaced by ‘xxxx’ for Internet distribution.]

This report looks at the armies of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military junta ruling Burma and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a Karen group allied with the SPDC, through the eyes of their own soldiers who have fled: the recruitment, the training, life in the battalions, relations with villagers and other groups, and their views on Burma’s present and future situation. What we find, particularly in the SPDC’s ‘Tatmadaw’ (Army), is conscription and coercion of children, systematic physical and psychological abuse by the officers, endemic corruption, and the rank and file of an entire Army forced into a system of brutality toward civilians. According to Tatmadaw deserters, one third or more of SPDC soldiers are children, morale among the rank and file is almost nonexistent, and half or more of the Army would desert if they thought they could survive the attempt. The Tatmadaw has expanded rapidly since repression of the democracy movement and the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, former name of the SPDC) in 1988. The Armed Forces as a whole have expanded from an estimated strength of 180,000 to over 400,000, making it the second-largest military in Southeast Asia after Vietnam. Military camps and soldiers are now common all over Burma, especially in the non-Burman ethnic states and divisions. With this increased military presence has come a rise in the scale of abuses and corruption committed by the Army. To achieve this military expansion, children as young as nine or ten are taken into the Army, trained and sent to frontline battalions. Of the six SPDC deserters interviewed for this report, five were under the age of 17 when they joined the Tatmadaw.

SPDC              State Peace & Development Council, military junta ruling Burma
PDC                Peace & Development Council, SPDC local-level administration
                      (e.g. Village PDC [VPDC], Village Tract PDC, Township PDC [TPDC])
SLORC            State Law & Order Restoration Council, former name of the SPDC until Nov. 1997
Tatmadaw      Army, also ‘Pyitthu Tatmadaw’ (People’s Army); the SPDC Army
IB                    Infantry Battalion (SLORC/SPDC), usually about 500 soldiers fighting strength
LIB                  Light Infantry Battalion (SLORC/SPDC), usually about 500 soldiers fighting strength
LID                 Light Infantry Division (SLORC/SPDC), 10 battalions for offensive operations
Sa Ka Ka          Abbreviation for SPDC’s Military Operations Commands, for offensive operations
Su Saung Yay   Depots where newly recruited men are kept before being sent to training camps
Pa Take           Burmanisation of the word ‘practice’; used by Burmese soldiers to describe the                         non-military labour which they must perform
Bo Muh            Literally ‘major’, but also used to refer to all officers
Saya/Saya Gyi Literally Teacher/Big Teacher; terms of respect used to refer to Corporals and
                      Sergeants respectively
NCO                 Non-commissioned officers; lance corporals, corporals and sergeants

DKBA               Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Karen group allied with SLORC/SPDC
Ko Per Baw    ‘Yellow Headbands’, common name for the DKBA
KNU                 Karen National Union, main Karen opposition group
KNLA               Karen National Liberation Army, army of the KNU
Nga Pway        ‘Ringworm’; derogatory SPDC slang for KNU/KNLA
Ko Per Lah      ‘Green Headbands’, name used by some villagers for the KNLA
Kaw Thoo Lei Karen name for their homeland, also often used to refer to KNU/KNLA

Viss                   Unit of weight measure; one viss is 1.6 kilograms or 3.5 pounds
Bowl/Pyi          Volume of rice equal to 8 small condensed milk tins; about 2 kilograms / 4.4 pounds
Kyat                  Burmese currency; US$1=6 Kyat at official rate, 500+ Kyat at current market rate
loh ah pay        Forced labour; literally it means traditional voluntary labour, but not under SPDC

You may scroll down sequentially through the report, or click on a heading to go directly to that section (to see the maps you must click on 'Map 1' or 'Map 2' below).

Never hesitating, always ready to sacrifice blood and sweat is the Tatmadaw.
– Tatmadaw slogan

The Burmese Army has been involved in military operations against resistance groups since Burma gained independence from Great Britain in 1948. Fighting was widespread with various Burman and ethnic political groups engaged in campaigns to create ethnic homelands or change the Burmese government. The Army was seen as the defender of the Burman people from these groups. This all changed after the coup of 1962 which installed the military government that has continued in power, under various names, until now. In the early 1970’s the Army began what it called the Pya Lay Pya or ‘Four Cuts’ campaigns in various parts of the country. These campaigns were aimed at cutting off the food, funds, intelligence and recruits to the resistance groups. By 1988 the military junta had virtually destroyed the economy and the people were ready for a change. Up until this time the Army was able to get more volunteers than it needed and many Burman people still believed in the Army as their protectors. That all changed with the brutal crackdown on the pro-democracy protests and the 1990 elections. The people had stood up to the Army and it was no longer the respected institution that it had been. There was also still the problem of the ethnic armed resistance movements on the borders. The new State Law and Order Restoration Council’s (SLORC) response was to begin a programme of rapid expansion of the Tatmadaw, the Burmese Army, and an increased militarisation of Burmese society.

The SLORC’s expansion programme has seen the Army grow from 170,000 to over 400,000 and close to a stated goal of 500,000. This makes it the second largest military in Southeast Asia after Vietnam, and one of the largest in the world. Army camps have mushroomed all over the country and areas that almost never had a military presence before now have an almost constant one. This expansion is despite the fact that Burma has no aggressive external enemies and most of the resistance groups have cease-fires with the regime. The programme has also included the modernisation of the Tatmadaw’s weapons. Small arms, heavy artillery, tanks, fighter jets and ammunition have been bought from various countries, especially from China. In addition to this, China and Singapore have been assisting the military-owned Defense Services Industries to modernise old factories and to build new ones to produce new lines of small arms, ammunition and landmines.

This rapid expansion has had an almost opposite effect on the quality of the officers and men of the Tatmadaw. A constant stream of new recruits must be brought in to ensure the continued expansion and to replace losses. The Army’s loss of prestige has meant that its old recruitment practices cannot guarantee it enough recruits. To make up for it the Army has been accepting young men which it would have denied as physically unfit before. They have also begun using more devious tactics of recruitment. Young men are tricked into joining by being promised jobs or after being invited to drink alcohol. People arrested for minor offences are threatened with prison if they do not join. Children are also targeted as they are easy to convince or trick. The result is that the Army has a high percentage of men who did not choose to be there and thus the enthusiasm and professionalism in the Army has suffered greatly. The training for the new soldiers is usually for four months although some have been known to stay for as long as six because their equipment has not arrived and they must work around the training camps for the profit of the instructors. The training consists of drills in military parade and discipline, tactics and weapons. No human rights, politics or cultural awareness courses are taught. This is also where the new soldiers become aware of the endemic corruption and abuse in the Army. The trainees have to work on projects which benefit the instructors monetarily and they are beaten or otherwise abused for poor performance in the training.

The life of a soldier in the Burmese Army is not an easy one. In the rear area battalion camps the soldiers are assigned duties on the battalion projects. After the rations were drastically cut in 1998, many of the battalions seized land from the villagers and used it to grow crops for the soldiers to eat. The villagers still do most of the labour on this land, while the soldiers supervise them. Soldiers are also put to work in brick kilns and cutting trees and bamboo. The bricks, wood and much of the produce from the fields are sold by the officers for a profit. The soldiers get nothing. Many of the rations that are sent are also stolen by the officers and quartermaster sergeants and sold, leaving the privates with very little to eat, while the officers have very good curries. Most of the soldiers’ uniforms and equipment must be purchased by the soldiers themselves, which further reduces a salary which has had many deductions taken out already. The officers claim that these deductions go to good causes like support for schools, but the schools and other projects never see any of this money and the privates know that it is just pocketed by the officers. Any complaints about food, work, salaries or anything else to the officers is met with scorn and quite often a slap across the face or a more severe punishment. The soldiers are cut off from home with leave almost never granted; letters from home are destroyed before they arrive and those sent are thrown away by the officers. Soldiers are not allowed to listen to the radio and only allowed to read what the Army says they can.

The resistance groups in Burma operate in small guerrilla units and so there are no real frontlines, but areas of relative control. In the areas where the resistance forces operate the problems for the Burmese soldiers are compounded by the tension of possible ambush or landmines. Combat is not frequent, but the threat is always there. Losses for the Burmese Army are usually much higher than for the resistance. Medicines and medics are available but not in large quantities and the distances travelled before reaching help are considerable. The soldiers are treated even worse by the officers at the ‘frontline’. Beatings and other punishments are severe for even minor infractions. The soldiers often don’t get enough food and must resort to stealing it from the villagers, while the officers simply issue an order and receive pork or chicken from a village. This food is never shared with the privates. The soldiers are ordered to force the villagers to work on roads, as porters and in the camp. Although the soldiers are uncomfortable with this, they are more afraid of what the officers will do to them if they show any leniency to the villagers. Soldiers are forced to participate in things which they disagree with but see no way out of it. Many are brutalised to the point of not caring anymore.

The expansion of the Tatmadaw has also seen a corresponding increase in human rights abuses perpetrated by it. The Army’s Four Cuts campaigns are no longer carried out in small areas for relatively short periods of time. They are now almost constant in most ethnic areas, especially the areas of operation of groups which have not made cease-fires with the SPDC. The soldiers are not unaware of how the villagers view them. They don’t like what they are doing, but don’t see many ways out. The SPDC tries to keep the soldiers politically unaware by controlling what they can read and listen to. Any soldiers or officers who get together to talk about their problems and how to change them risk being reported by the network of informers in the military. Soldiers and officers have been imprisoned for just talking about democracy. Despite these attempts to stifle dissent, most of the soldiers have no respect for their officers and have seen the abuse of the villagers with their own eyes. They no longer believe in the Tatmadaw as the unifier of Burma and the guardian of its people.

There are very few ways out of this for the soldiers. Some see no way out and choose suicide. Others attempt to desert. This is very risky since recapture means imprisonment or even execution. This is especially the case for soldiers who desert while on operations or if they take a weapon with them. There is also much uncertainty involved since the officers often tell the soldiers that they will be tortured and killed by the resistance soldiers if they are caught. Once the soldiers reach the resistance forces they are treated well. They cannot, however, go home as they will be arrested. Some join the resistance groups while others join the illegal immigrant work force in Thailand.

In southeastern Burma the SPDC has an uneasy ally in the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The DKBA was founded in late 1994 by the Buddhist monk U Thuzana from dissatisfied Buddhist members of the KNU and KNLA. The SLORC (now SPDC) supplied the new group with arms, ammunition, salaries, rations, and logistical support, and promised it control of Karen State if it would help to eradicate the KNU. In response the DKBA, which had already signed a peace agreement with the KNU, tore up this agreement and began helping the SLORC to attack the KNU/KNLA as well as most of the Karen refugee camps in Thailand. When it became apparent that the SLORC’s promises would never be honoured and that the DKBA was not helping the situation of the villagers, most of the ex-KNLA and KNDO soldiers, who originally formed the bulk of the DKBA, left. They were replaced by villagers who joined because of the money and power it would give them, so their families would not have to go for forced labour, or because they were conscripted. This spelled the end for any political aims of the DKBA to improve the situation of the villagers.

The DKBA has 1,500-2,500 soldiers spread out in Pa’an, Papun, Thaton and northern Dooplaya Districts. There has never been much centralised control in the DKBA and most of its officers function as petty warlords in their areas. The DKBA headquarters at Myaing Gyi Ngu, once a growing town, has seen most of its population return to their villages because of lack of food. DKBA soldiers regularly fight the KNLA as well as assist SPDC units on their operations. Both the DKBA and the SPDC soldiers are wary of each other and fights have been reported between them. Over the past few years the SPDC has gradually taken away support from the DKBA. DKBA soldiers no longer receive salaries from the SPDC, food rations were cut back and now have been discontinued, and weapons and ammunition are only given in small quantities. The KNU has made it their official policy to welcome back DKBA soldiers and their families who want to join them, but no talks have been held to reunite the two organisations or establish peace between them.

While some DKBA commanders still try to help the villagers and even protect them from the worst of the SPDC’s abuses, most units are increasingly turning towards money making projects. The DKBA is heavily involved in the black market logging business and in smuggling cattle to Thailand. DKBA units levy taxes on villagers’ crops, demand money at checkpoints along roads and rivers, and demand forced labour to work in the camps and on money making projects for the DKBA. Other forced labour involves repairing roads, building pagodas and portering for DKBA units. In general the conditions while performing this forced labour are better than doing forced labour or portering for the SPDC. However, some DKBA commanders are known for being vicious, burning houses of suspected KNU sympathisers, and torturing and even killing villagers for failing to pay DKBA taxes or other minor ‘offences’. Families of KNU or KNLA members are particularly at risk. In areas where the DKBA works closely with the SPDC or behaves just as badly as the SPDC troops, many villagers no longer distinguish between the two, referring to both as "the Burmese". When the DKBA was first formed, many civilians gravitated towards the group because they saw hope for a possible break in the age-old deadlock between the KNU and the Burmese regime; but the DKBA is now seen as little more than a self-interested SPDC-controlled militia, and civilian support for the group is all but nonexistent.

Only when the Tatmadaw is strong will the nation be strong.
– Tatmadaw slogan

The Burmese Army is the second largest in Southeast Asia and one of the largest in the world. There are at present about 400,000 officers and men in the Army. This is a very large standing army for a country with no real external enemies. In neighbouring Thailand, a country with a slightly larger population, the Royal Thai Army numbers only about 150,000. Organisationally, the Burmese Army is not structured to deal with an external threat, but to wage counter-insurgency operations as well as keeping the civilian population in check. Large battles rarely take place in Burma, with most of the fighting involving small ambushes in the jungle or assaults on remote mountain top camps. The last major offensive involving tens of thousands of soldiers from various Light Infantry Divisions and Regional Commands was in the Dooplaya district of Karen State and in Tenasserim Division in 1997. Since that time, the Burmese Army has been engaged in low-intensity counter-insurgency operations against the various ethnic resistance groups. This is partly because the resistance groups have forsaken bases and large formations for mobile guerrilla warfare, but also because of the negative foreign attention which large-scale offensives bring.

The bulk of the Army is divided into twelve regional commands, each of which is responsible for one or more of Burma’s states or divisions. The regional command commanders are also the chairmen of those states and divisions under their control as well as members of the Central Committee of the SPDC. Their positions make them the military as well as the civil authorities in the region. Their membership in the SPDC Central Committee also makes them responsible for what happens in those areas on a national level. The regional commands each have three to four Strategic Operations Commands (SOC) which are responsible for areas within their region. Each SOC has three to four battalions assigned to it for garrison duties and limited offensive actions. Battalions rotate in and out of the ‘frontline’ areas every three months. Regional commands responsible for central Burma are in areas where there have been no active resistance movements for many years, but they still have at least 10 battalions on garrison duty. This is a large number of troops for an area, such as Rangoon, where there has been no insurgency since the 1950’s. They could probably be better used at the frontline, unless their purpose is to watch the civilian populations of those areas. Occasionally these commands do send units to the frontline in other command areas, usually for the purposes of specific offensive operations. An example of this is the SOC from the Western Regional Command in Arakan State which for a number of years has been stationed in Toungoo district in the Southern Regional Command area.

The main offensive arms of the Burmese Army are the Light Infantry Divisions (LID) and the Sa Ka Ka [Military Operations Commands]. The ten Light Infantry Divisions are under the direct control of Army headquarters in Rangoon. Each of the LID’s have ten battalions in three Tactical Operations Commands (TOC), which act as operational headquarters for three to four battalions each. These divisions have been used extensively in counter-insurgency operations since their inception in the mid-1960’s as well as having a central role in putting down demonstrations in Rangoon in 1974 and 1988. The thirteen Sa Ka Ka are similar to the LID’s with ten battalions in three TOC’s. It is unclear yet whether they are under the command of the regional commands in which they are based or directly under the War Office in Rangoon. They are, however, offensive formations and do sometimes operate in other areas besides where they are based. Both the LID’s and the Sa Ka Ka are sent wholly or in part to frontline areas for specific operations which may last for as long as eight months or more.

The Burmese Army has infantry, artillery, armour, engineer and transport battalions, but the mountainous and forested nature of the resistance areas has made the infantry battalion the usual operational unit of the Burmese Army. There are two kinds of infantry battalions, the Infantry Battalion (IB) and the Light Infantry Battalion (LIB). The IB’s are for garrison duty and patrolling while the LIB’s are for offensive operations, but sometimes the roles are reversed; the offensive LID’s have both IB’s and LIB's. Each battalion has a battalion headquarters, four rifle companies, a heavy weapons company (mortars and machine guns) and a support company. In the field, battalions often operate in columns of several platoons or companies. Occasionally columns are formed out of a whole battalion or even several battalions. Officially, each battalion is to have 777 officers and men, but in practice there are no more than 500 and often far less than that. Two deserters interviewed for this report from Pa’an District indicated that their battalion was down to only about 170 officers and men and that other battalions had no more than 200. The very high desertion rate since 1998 was given as the reason. Reports from KHRG field reporters and KNU indicated that this is true of the battalions in Thaton, Papun and Dooplaya districts also.

"I was in Company #x. When we were moving, there were five people in one section and the Saya Gyi [sergeants] controlled them. In most of the companies there are 20 or 21 soldiers." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"There are 21 people [in his Company]. There are over 170 people in the battalion. It is not many. The organisational structure is not full. In the past there were 777 men in one battalion. This was from 1996 to 1998. Then this was no more. Many people fled. Some were sent to prison [for desertion] and left the Army. Then the Army arrested them again [after they had served their prison terms]. Most of them had fled. Everyone fled. The Saya [Corporals] and also the Saya Gyi [sergeants] fled. … The other battalions are the same. They all fled. Now there are over 170 people in a battalion. The other battalions have no more than 200." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

Until the expansion programme began in 1988, the weapons and equipment for the Burmese soldiers had often been inferior to that of the resistance forces. After the crackdown and coup of 1988, the SLORC began receiving increased foreign military assistance from various sources, especially the People’s Republic of China. In addition to the foreign material assistance, there has also been help in the way of improvements to the SPDC’s defence industry with new plants being built with Chinese and Singaporean assistance to produce everything from landmines to a new line of assault rifles. The result is that Burmese soldiers are equipped with a variety of weapons. The standard assault rifle has for decades been the G3 and the standard light machine gun the G4; both made in Burma with the help of the German company Fritz-Werner. Since 1988, AK47 and M16 assault rifles have been obtained from China and Singapore respectively and issued to the soldiers. In the last few years the Burmese arms industry has been producing several new weapons of its own. A line of weapons known as MA1 to MA4, designed with Chinese help, have been issued to some units (MA stands for ‘Myanmar Army’). The MA1 is a copy of the Chinese AK47 with the MA3 the same with a folding stock and the MA4 with a grenade launcher under the barrel. The MA2 is a copy of the Chinese RPD light machine gun. An MA7 is also produced, a copy of the Chinese RPG7 rocket propelled grenade launcher. A new line reported as MA11 - MA14 is now being issued to replace the MA1 - MA4 line because the latter were deemed to be of poor quality. These appear to be based on the Israeli Galil assault rifle and the MA13 on the Israeli Uzi sub-machine gun. It is not clear how widely these have been issued, but KHRG has seen captured versions of these weapons carried by KNLA soldiers. The heavy weapons companies are equipped with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers and 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars from various sources. The SPDC has also purchased heavy artillery from China and other countries, but these are rarely used due to the highly mobile nature of the guerrilla war being fought by the resistance groups. There appears to be no dearth of ammunition for these weapons, soldiers carry enough for about 4 or 5 magazines plus loose ammunition, and more is carried by the porters. The deserters interviewed commented that they felt it was enough for the frontline although less ammunition was issued in the rear areas.

"They gave me an MA 1. It is the same design as the AK. They didn’t tell us where it was made, but the name of the gun is MA 1. The [serial] number of my gun was xxxx. The Chinese sent them to Burma and then the Burmese designed it. … I could take 240, 250 or 260 bullets with a guarantee [the soldiers have to account for all of the bullets when they hand them back in after a patrol or operation]. We took four or five magazines. The gun and bullets were enough for me at the frontline." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"I was issued an MA 2. It is not the same as an MA 1. The MA 2 looks like a Chinese machine gun. There is also an MA 3 and an MA 4. … I was given 360 bullets. It was enough for me. It was enough for one fight. They also ordered the wontan [‘servants’, i.e. porters] to carry boxes with over 1,000 bullets inside each." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

The personal equipment carried by the soldiers does not appear to have enjoyed the same quality upgrade as the weapons. Much of this has to do with the endemic corruption in the Tatmadaw. All of the deserters interviewed say they were issued with poor quality OG-brand uniforms. OG is a company in Burma known for its poor quality, but cheap clothing. These uniforms reportedly fall apart in a very short time, especially on operations in the jungle. Only one uniform is issued per year and the soldiers have to buy their own replacements. Some soldiers get a hold of better Det Tret uniforms by buying the material and sewing them up themselves. Soldiers are also given jungle boots, a jungle hat, towel, mosquito net, a thick, rough blanket, and a set of web gear. Mess tins are only given to corporals and sergeants. Vests and slippers are also occasionally given. Much of what is sent by the government is sold off by the officers and supply sergeants for a personal profit. Inferior equipment is bought and issued to the soldiers and the difference in price pocketed by the officers. Whatever the soldiers don’t have like backpacks, tents, slippers, and even rank and unit insignia, the soldiers have to buy themselves. For these reasons, the soldiers spend much of their pay buying new boots or another uniform. This has had a direct effect on the morale of the soldiers, who know what they are supposed to be issued but are forced to buy the equipment and go to the frontline with equipment which they know is inferior, while the officers and supply sergeants get rich off the equipment they have sold off or exchanged for lower quality goods.

"The OG uniform [OG is a brand name of clothing made in Burma which is known for its poor quality; they also make the uniforms for the Burmese Army] they gave us was no good to wear. It was very heavy when it got wet. The uniforms were all ragged after we went for a military operation for one week. We couldn’t wear them anymore." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"They gave three sets of OG uniforms. They also gave jungle boots, a jungle hat, towel, mosquito net, a thick, rough blanket and equipment. … They gave us a uniform when we were at the training school. We had to buy it ourselves with our salary. They gave us one once a year. They gave us an OG uniform and jungle boots. Sometimes they gave us a vest and sometimes they gave us slippers. This was only every one or two years. They also gave us a mess tin every one or two years. If we didn’t have them, then we had to buy uniforms, backpacks, tents and everything, even slippers." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"They only gave us OG uniforms [a cheap type of uniform that wears out quickly] once every 6 months, and new web gear, hat and boots once a year. Lately, we were wearing Det Tret uniforms [better material] that we sewed ourselves." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

"The next morning one of the soldiers came to them and the police handed me over to him. Then they sent me to the Mingaladon Su Saung Yay place in Rangoon [this is a gathering and processing centre for new Army recruits]. I told them, ‘I would like to go back to my parents. Send me to the monastery.’ They told me they couldn’t send me back." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

The Tatmadaw claims to be an all volunteer force with the young men of Burma joining out of national pride and a sense of duty. For the most part this is a myth spread by the SPDC’s propaganda machine. Some young men do join the Tatmadaw for the same reasons that many young men all over the world join the military, for the fancy uniform and a chance to prove their bravery in a glorious battle. This is rare though, as the Tatmadaw no longer enjoys the respect that it once did among the population, especially since the brutal crushing of the pro-democracy movement in 1988. Of those who volunteer for the Tatmadaw these days, most are impressionable teenagers drawn by the uniform and the lure of a few hundred Kyat in cash every month. Many of them have family problems they are trying to escape, feel that they are a burden to their families because they are unemployed, or feel that if they join their families will be protected from forced labour or extortion.

"My economic situation was not going well, so my friends called me to enter the Army, and I joined. My friends told me that if we joined the Army, when we got permission we could go back home wearing our uniforms proudly. We would also get money and wear gold and silver. They spoke to me like that and that is why I followed them. They had heard that from other people. They had also seen one or two soldiers. Three of us joined. One of them was named Nay Myo, but I forgot the name of the other one. People said that Nay Myo got malaria and died. It was at the frontline. I don’t know where the other one went." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District; he joined when he was 14 (Interview #2, 12/2000)

The rapid expansion of the Tatmadaw and attempts to keep up its strength level despite desertions and casualties has fostered an insatiable need for new recruits which cannot be met by luring impressionable volunteers. Standards of age or fitness are no longer applied; now the Tatmadaw will take almost anyone, and is using increasingly aggressive tactics to get them. A large proportion, possibly even the majority, are now taken into the Tatmadaw against their will. Recruitment centres are given quotas, and issue orders to villages in the area to hand over young men on a regular basis to fill them; villagers have told KHRG that the bribe necessary to escape this quota conscription is far more than they can ever pay. Undercover recruiters in plain clothes latch onto men at bus stops, in tea shops and at festivals, say they have a good job available and then take them to the recruitment offices. Sometimes they invite teenagers to eat and drink, get them drunk and then drag them to a recruiting station. One man interviewed for this report was invited to drink alcohol with a stranger in plain clothes until he passed out; when he awoke, he was on a boat which functioned as a recruiting station. The recruiter was nowhere in sight, and the Sergeant told him he had already been signed up and if he tried to refuse he’d be sent to prison. Some of these undercover recruiters are soldiers, while others appear to be agents paid by recruiting offices for each person they can drag in by whatever means necessary.

Other methods are even less subtle; deserters have described being arrested by the police and then being given the option of joining the Tatmadaw or going to prison. One young man was caught out at night while going to a festival without his nationality card. He was accused by the police of "hiding in the dark", an offence so sweeping that almost anyone out after dark can be arrested, and then given the option of the Army or jail. Some of those arrested are not even charged with anything, just told that if they refuse to join they must be a spy so they will go to prison. In past interviews with KHRG, some former soldiers have also reported that when their tour of duty was over they were told that they would only be released after they had provided 5 or 10 new recruits - and to get these recruits, most of them go to the schools and markets to look for young boys.

"[I] went to the Bayinnaung festival in Rangoon with my friends. On the way, I visited a section [of Rangoon] with a group of my friends. I asked my friends to wait for me in the dark so I could urinate. I don’t know if they heard me or not. When I finished, my friends were not there. Five or six police came to me. They ran and chased me to arrest me. They tried to arrest all four of us, but the others fled and escaped. They could only arrest me. They asked me if I had brought my nationality card [identity cards which are supposed to be carried by all Burmese, but are commonly left at home]. I told them I didn’t bring it, but that I was a student and had come with my friends. I pointed to my friends, but they were gone. They had disappeared. I told them I hadn’t brought my student card. They didn’t like that. They put handcuffs on me and took me to their station. … They questioned me about why I was going around in that section without a nationality card. They told me they had arrested me because they suspected me of doing something or hiding in the dark [this accusation is often used by Burmese police and is so sweeping that almost anyone can be arrested for it just by being out after dark]." – He was sent the next day to become a soldier; "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"When I was younger I fought with my stepfather. My stepfather punched me, so I returned and beat him. Then I ran away. When I ran away my stepfather said I had beaten him and run, so he asked the police to arrest me. Then the SPDC pointed at me with a pistol and called me. They arrested me in B--- in Mingaladon." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"When my father died, I went to find a job in Rangoon. When I got off the Sawbwagyi Gone bus [in Insein, Rangoon] I went to look for a job. While I was looking I met two SPDC sergeants and they said, ‘Come brother, we will give you a job.’ I said, ‘Yes, I will follow you.’ At first they didn’t ask me if I would join the Army, they just said they would find a job for me [in this ‘recruiting’ method the soldiers don’t wear uniforms and do not say they are soldiers. They only reveal their identity after they have taken the ‘recruit’ to the Army recruitment depot]. They sent me directly to the Su Saung Yay [depot for new recruits] and cut my hair. I had to sleep there for two nights and then they sent me directly to the training." - "Thein Htay" (M, 26), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #340, Papun District (Interview #5, 11/2000)

"I think I was 13 years old at that time. They took my book and everything, so I don’t remember what year. It was in the daytime at 11 or 12:00, during the cold season [December - February 1996]." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District; at 13, he was arrested for not having an identity card on him and forced into the Army, though he says he only wanted to continue going to school (Interview #1, 12/2000)

Shanghaied at Seventeen

"Before I reached my village up the stream, I came to M--- village. The Burmese were having a religious festival there. I went in to the festival and drank alcohol with my friends. The festival lasted until morning. We drank alcohol until 12 a.m. At 1 a.m., a policeman came and called me. I’d always seen this policeman at K--- village, and I thought he wanted me to show the way to someone’s house so I followed him. He took me to a Burmese man in civilian clothes, left me with him and said, "Young brother, wait a while here for me". I waited, but after awhile I thought he wasn’t coming back. Then the Burmese said, "Young brother, don’t worry if he doesn’t come. Follow me for a while." He was in civilian clothes, so I didn’t think he was anyone in particular. He asked me, "Do you know B--- village?" B--- village is to the east of M--- village. I told him, "I know that place, in the past I stayed there." Then he said to me, "Send your brother [me] to B--- for a moment." I didn’t know that he was a soldier. I had always tried to escape from the soldiers and never let them see me. One of them had already tried to persuade me before, but I didn’t follow him. He said, "If you enter the army, we will give you money and give money to your parents." But I didn’t follow him. I was careful.

This time, I saw that he was wearing civilian clothes and I didn’t remember to be careful. He asked me to send him to B--- village. He was one of the people who recruit soldiers [but I didn’t know it]. When we got there he couldn’t convince me to get onto the boat [a boat in the river]. So he asked me, ‘Younger brother, what kind of food do you like?’ I said, ‘I like alcohol. I drink alcohol.’ Then he fed me alcohol until I was drunk. When I was drunk he called me onto the boat.

When I woke up, I looked around and he was not there. At the writing table on the boat I saw a person with three chevrons [Sergeant] holding a pen. I looked at him, but I dared not call to him. I thought if I talk to him, do I call him an officer or a corporal? I dared not talk to him. A soldier came toward me and said, ‘Younger brother, are you going to enter the army?’ I said, ‘Elder brother, I’m not going to.’

He said, ‘You say you’re not going to, but last night you came here staggering and said that you would join the army.’ I said, ‘No, one Brother asked me to come here. At that time I ate and drank a little.’ Then he told me, ‘You will enter the army as you told me when you arrived here. You told us that when you arrived. You say we called you here. Never mind.’

Later as we went along the way, I told him that I wouldn’t join the army. They sent me to xxxx, at my village. There is a camp there called K--- that takes security for the village. That is where Infantry Battalion #xx Sergeant K--- was staying. When I arrived there, I refused to join but they said, ‘You can’t. You have come to us, and you must join the Army.’ I said, ‘I won’t join. I don’t dare be a soldier. I have no experience, I am a farmer with no education. I can’t be a soldier.’ He said, ‘You can do it, don’t worry about it.’ So I said, ‘Even if I can, I won’t.’ Then Sergeant Kyaw Ngwe asked me, ‘If you don’t want to enter the army, did you bring your headman’s signature? Did you bring your nationality card?’ I said, ‘No, I didn’t.’ I told him that someone called me in the night and asked me to send him along his way, and I did. I was just visiting a festival, so I didn’t have my nationality card or recommendation letter. He said, ‘No, you can’t do like that. You went from one village to another. Even if you didn’t take an ID card, you need a letter of recommendation.’ He told me that if I didn’t bring it then I didn’t have it. If I didn’t have it, then he would arrest me as a spy. He then asked me my nationality. I told him that I am Karen. He said, ‘You Karen people are no good. All of you Karen people are bad people, relatives of the rebels. If you don’t have a recommendation letter and a nationality card, we will arrest you as a rebel spy. Will you go to prison, or will you join the Army?’ That was not a difficult decision for me. If I went to prison, it would be for 4 to 6 years. I thought that if I joined the army and if I didn’t die, one day I would arrive back to my village and see my parents. If I went to prison, my parents’ name would be destroyed. My status in society would be lowered. I told him that I would join the Army."

- "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

"For example, some people in Rangoon are going to market. When they are at the market, they [people who recruit for the Army] call the children and feed them snacks. Their parents don’t know about it. The SPDC changes their names and addresses. Then they order the children to attend the training. I saw two or three children like that when I attended the training." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

The ‘recruits’ are taken to the Su Saung Yay, the recruit depot where they are processed, have their hair cut and wait to join a training session. They cannot protest their ‘enlistment’; they are told they have already been put on the register and cannot leave. All of their clothing is confiscated and they are issued one pair of shorts. The Su Saung Yay consists of only a few barracks in a compound. Recruits are sent to the training camps when there are enough men in a group to go; the wait is sometimes a few days and sometimes as long as a month. The food is poor at the Su Saung Yay, and the recruits must remain indoors at all times to prevent escape. The recruits interviewed by KHRG said that they were even required to strip naked if they wanted to use the toilet, and that sentries were posted outside.

"When I told them I would like to go back outside [to go home], they asked me, ‘Will you enter here, or will you enter prison?’ They gave me only two options. I didn’t want to be in prison. My parents had told me about prison. So, I joined them [the Army]. … We had to stay inside all the time. When we went to the latrine, they ordered us to take off all our clothes, then they allowed us to go to the latrine. They kept one, two or three sentries. They were worried we would escape." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"They kept us for one night there and then sent us to Toungoo Su Saung Yay, at Toungoo. We stayed there over a week. There were about 500 people there in 2 buildings. All of us were new recruits - they gathered together all the people they’d captured or recruited, and people who’d joined because their businesses failed. They confiscated all of our clothing and gave us only short pants to wear, then kept us locked up in the building all day in our short pants." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

To prevent disintegration of the Union is our aim, so shall we strive.
- SPDC/Tatmadaw slogan

"They taught us how to shoot guns, how to carry them and how to fix them. They allowed us to shoot the guns and throw hand grenades. They taught and we had to shoot. We also had to practice climbing mountains and they taught us many other things. … They didn’t teach us about politics, or how to treat civilians, or human rights. They didn’t tell us anything. They gave us only military training." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

Once the recruits are processed through the Su Saung Yay, they are sent to one of the training centres. The training centres are located in various places throughout Burma; the deserters interviewed for this report attended training at Oak Twin and Toungoo in Pegu Division, Kyo Pyu in Rangoon Division, Yamethin in Mandalay Division and at Mergui in Tenasserim Division. There are as many as 250 - 450 trainees in each training session, although this varies from school to school. There are five to eight instructors at the training centres, both officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO’s). One soldier said that his instructors were ordered by their superior officers not to give their names to the trainees; even so, after several months of training many soldiers seem to know the names of their trainers.

"They sent me to attend the training at the Oak Twin training school in Pegu Division for 6 months. They sent me by truck. There were over 50 people attending the training with me. The whole group went there, about 54 people. They were the people who had stayed and slept with me in the same barracks. It was all of them. They [the camp officials] called our names and the names of our parents and then they sent us. The people in the other barracks were being gathered to attend the next training." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"They took me to the training place at Kyo Pyu Tine Ba Hoh #1 [Kyo Pyu Division Headquarters #1]. I didn’t start training at once. I had to rest for one month. They gave me a chance to rest for one month. They didn’t send us to the Su Saung Yay [gathering place for new recruits before they are sent to the training camps] because we were close to Rangoon. They were worried we would run back, so they sent us directly to the training place." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"There were five or six instructors. In the six months the Bo Muh [the officers] didn’t tell us their names. Their superior officers told them not to. They just gave us the training. After they trained us, they went back to their Army family camp [the camp where soldiers and their families live]. They came to teach us at 10 a.m. or 12 p.m. and in the afternoon they went back at 4 or 5 p.m. We didn’t get a chance to learn their names and we couldn’t ask them." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"I attended over 4 months of training. 250 people attended that training. We had military training in small arms and military parade." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

Four months basic military training is given at these centres. Soldiers are taught discipline, parade drill and military terms. They are taught how to travel and eat in the field and how to climb mountains. Tactics such as mountain assaults and how to engage the enemy are taught. The trainees are instructed in such small arms skills as how to carry their weapons, care for their weapons, how to fix weapons and how to shoot them. The proper way to plant landmines is also taught. The trainees are first taught by the instructors and then allowed to practice skills like shooting and throwing grenades. No political or human rights training is given. There are also no courses on how to deal with civilians or about the non-Burman ethnic nationalities in the areas where many of them will be posted. This seems to be the norm, although one deserter did claim to be taught not to steal people’s things and not to abuse the civilians. He then went on to say that when he arrived in the field, the soldiers were doing it anyway. One soldier said that field training was given from 6 a.m. to 12 noon, then the trainees were sent to study military terms and discipline, after which they were taken back out into the field for lectures on military topics. Sometimes the training is only in the morning, after which the soldiers must go to perform labour on projects for the instructors until 5 p.m.

"They taught us the military methods. They taught us how to hold guns, how to run and how to fight the enemy. They taught us what to do when we were travelling or eating. They taught us how to fight when our enemies were staying on a mountain. They also had us practice it ourselves. ... They taught us from 6 a.m. to 12 p.m. After they taught us, they sent us to a hall for writing and explained to us about the military terms. Then they told us what we shouldn’t do [this is what they shouldn’t do militarily and not what they shouldn’t do to civilians]. Then they drove us outside [the camp] again. After we got there, we had to queue up and then each group of us had to go under the bamboo or under the trees where one of the officers held a book in front of us and taught us." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"They ordered us to do military training in the morning. It started at half past 7 a.m. until 12 noon. They stopped at 1 p.m. and ordered us to do Pa Take until 5 p.m. For Pa Take we had to cut firewood and pick stones which they [the instructors] then sold for their families. We had to do it for them. They called it Pa Take. It is Burmese language and means to have to do social service." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"In the training, they said to not steal people’s things and to not abuse the civilians. They taught many things, but when we arrived here [at the frontline] they were doing it and it hurt the villagers. That is why I don’t like it. I came here when I arrived at the frontline. When they saw a paddy barn, they burned it. They burned whatever they saw. They are doing it under duress. So, I don’t like this." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"They taught us how to handle a gun, that we must dare to fight the enemy and that we must protect the civilians. They didn’t teach about human rights in our unit." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"They didn’t teach me about politics or the Karen. They taught me about how to fight, how to meet with the enemy, how to go and how to walk. They teach it all. The trainer was Major Soe Chit. The soldiers obeyed in front of him, but they behaved differently behind his back." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

After the four months of military training, some soldiers reported being forced to do labour at the training centre for another two months. The soldiers call it Pa Take; a military term described by deserters as ‘social service’ labour much like loh ah pay is for civilians. Pa Take is a Burmanisation of the English word ‘Practice’, a kind of joke since the practice they are doing has nothing to do with military exercises. One deserter commented that the reason for having to wait was because their equipment hadn’t arrived yet. Much of the work is on agricultural projects like rubber plantations and tree planting, probably for the personal profit of the instructors and senior officers. Other agricultural work involves growing vegetables like roselle and gourds. Wood and bamboo is also cut for the instructors’ families, whether to build their houses or to sell for personal profit. The villagers’ bullock carts are also commandeered for this. Wood is cut for firewood and stones are gathered, both to be sold by the instructors for their own profit and to be used in the camp. The soldiers are ordered to work from 6 a.m. to noon. They eat rice at 1 p.m. and then start working again at 1:30.

"It was not only military training. We also had to do agriculture; making rubber plantations and planting trees [they were not taught agriculture, but had to work at it]. We had to do Pa Take. We called it Pa Take. Pa Take means Loh Ah Pay [the term used for civilian forced labour]. It means we have to work. We had to go and do Loh Ah Pay." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"Sometimes they didn’t send material for the Army, so we had to work for two months [until their equipment arrived]. We had to do Pa Take. We had to do Loh Ah Pay [forced labour]. They ordered us to work from 6 a.m. to 12 p.m. After we ate rice at 1 p.m., we started to work again at 1:30 p.m. We had to cut bamboo and trees on the hill for their families [the instructors’ families] to lay their floors and build their houses. After we cut the trees, we had to carry the wood back to the car road. Then they demanded bullock carts from the nearby villages and sent the wood to the Army camp." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

The food during the training is generally bad. One soldier described it as "the same as pig food". The trainees interviewed by KHRG were fed one plate of rice with one plate of bean curry, with some pumpkin and gourd in the morning. The food is not enough for the trainees, and they are not allowed to ask for more. They are told by the instructors that this is practice to prepare them for life in the field, but the practice became a regular occurrence. In reality, what was probably happening was that the instructors and officers were selling off the good rations for personal profit, leaving only insufficient quantities of bad quality rations for the recruits; this is also what is done in the field by Tatmadaw officers. The food and water were also reportedly not clean. The food for the instructors, however, was very good. Only one well was provided for the trainees at Tine Bo [Division Training Centre] #5 outside Toungoo and this had to be used by the 250 trainees for washing, drinking water and for cooking. Sick trainees are given medicine and allowed by the instructors to rest in the barracks, and the instructors periodically look in on them to make sure they are really sick.

"When they ate, the rice was very white. Everything including the curry was very white [meaning that it was very good quality]. They fed us rice and curry that was the same as pig food." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"During the training, they fed us one flat plate of rice and one plate of bean curry on a plastic plate. They fed us like that. In the morning they fed us gourds or pumpkin. … It wasn’t enough rice. We couldn’t ask for any more from them. They said they were giving us practice. It was a training school so they told us they were giving us practice [at the frontline there is usually not enough food for the soldiers]. At first, I was fed more than when I stayed at home, but later, they told us they were giving us practice [by cutting their rations] and this became regular." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"Sometimes they fed us good food, and sometimes it wasn’t good. When we attended training, the food and water were not clean. We ate badly. As for water, there was only one well for bathing for 250 people. We had to bathe, you fetch, I bathe, I fetch, you bathe. We cooked rice with that water, used it for bathing, and drank that water too." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

Beatings are meted out to the trainees as punishment. One soldier interviewed was beaten for saying that the officers at the Su Saung Yay had been doing bad things to the civilians. He was informed on by one of the other trainees and then slapped, punched and kicked by the instructors. Another form of punishment was to have a half a bag of sand mixed in with the rice before it was cooked. This punishment was meted out to all the trainees if any one of them performed badly. Soldiers who tried to escape from the training were dealt with harshly. After being recaptured, they were forced to lie down and be beaten by each of the remaining trainees, as many as 450. The escapees were then put in mediaeval-style leg stocks until the training was almost finished, then allowed out to complete their training. At another training camp, the deserters were beaten with a bamboo stick on the back and buttocks. Each company took a turn until all 250 trainees had a chance to hit the deserters one time each. Although they bled from the wounds, their wounds were not treated and they were placed immediately in the stocks were they remained for four to six days. This treatment instilled enough fear in the trainees that few tried to escape after that. Salaries are not always paid to the trainees and they must use whatever money they have. One soldier said that he was supposed to be paid a salary of 450 Kyat per month during his training, however so much was deducted from it that he only received between 40 and 60 Kyat. The deductions were for things like snacks, documents, erasers and chalk.

"I was beaten by them within the first two or three months of the training. I was together with my friends and talking about the bad things done by the officers at the Su Saung Yay. A person who heard us went to tell the instructors. They slapped my cheek, punched me with their fists and kicked me with their boots. I told them, ‘We are young people, friends talking and joking.’ They told me someone had come and told them. Then they punched me, slapped my cheek and kicked me. … That person went to tell them that I was speaking about the officers doing bad things to the civilians. He was attending the training and in the same unit with me. … When the news was sent that someone was not good, the Bo Muh [Major, or officer] from the training had a bad habit of putting a half a sack of sand into one sack of rice. Then they fed us. We ate, but we bit on stones. Each time we would chew we would bite a stone. There were also insects in the soup. If one of the trainees was no good, then all the trainees had a problem. They [the instructors] said they hated it when a person went to complain to them. That is why they did it." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"In our session there were four people who fled. Ko Ko and Yeh Min Htun were two of the people. There were two others from Tine Boh #1 [Division Training Centre], called Aung San and Pyi Than. Many people fled from there. They were not interested [in being soldiers]. If they could flee, they fled and if they could not flee [were recaptured] they were all beaten. They [the instructors] called all 450 trainees together and had them beat the deserters one by one. Some couldn’t endure this, but they dared not flee. They were afraid when they saw the SPDC recapture the trainees and beat them. The instructors ordered the deserters to lie down and ordered the soldiers one by one to beat them. Over 450 people beat each person who fled. They ordered every one to beat them. So, those trainees dared not flee. They were afraid. We were also afraid and dared not flee." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"If their mistake was big, they were put in the stocks. If their mistake was small, they just beat them. The people who fled had made a big mistake. … Four of them fled. Four people were put in the stocks, but not at the same time. The first time they put three together and then after that just one. … One company beat them and then another company beat them until all 250 people had beat them. One person one hit. They were beaten on the back and on their buttocks. They beat them with a fresh bamboo stick. It is 1½ inches around. They bled but they didn’t die. … They put them immediately into the stocks without treatment. They went and gave them food twice a day. They beat the first three people, but not the fourth one. The Captain didn’t let them beat him. They released them whenever they wanted to release them. They released them after four or five or six days. The fourth one was in the stocks for only four days and then his battalion came and took him." - "Aung Myint Win" (M, 15), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #504, Papun District (Interview #6, 3/2001)

"They never gave money to me. I had to be poor and use only the little bit of money I had brought from the monk [the monk at the monastery where he was studying had given him some money]. I brought a little over 2,000 Kyat from the monk. They didn’t give me a single coin of money." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"Yes, at first it was 450 Kyat, but in the end we only got 40, 50 or 60 Kyat. They cut off money for this and that and we also owed for snacks. We had to give for documents and other things like erasers and chalk, whatever." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

After the training, the soldiers are given their personnel numbers and sent to their assigned battalions. No home leave is granted first. The soldiers interviewed for this report felt that their training was enough to cope with the conditions at the frontline and in combat. Refresher training is given to some soldiers after a few years. Soldiers who have been selected by their officers are sent to Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) training; usually this is after five years’ service, but can be earlier. This training lasts for over three months and was described by one deserter who went through it as commando training. The prospective NCO’s are taught how to lead the other soldiers in combat. This usually happens after five years of service, but some soldiers are selected for it after basic training.

"I had to continue the training for more than three more months. That training is A’Kyat Ngyay training [preparatory training for Non-Commissioned Officers]. … [It was] Commando training, they chose the soldiers and asked us to attend the special military training [a training for soldiers who are particularly clever or brave]. On the battlefields we must be brave. We must dare to go. They were planning like that and they ordered us to attend the training. After that training we had to do sentry duty at the camp for two years. After two years we came to the frontline." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

The Army is your true mother, your true father. Trust none but your own blood.
- Tatmadaw slogan taught to recruits

"They take them forcibly. The children are not interested [in being soldiers]. I also was not interested, but they pointed a gun at me and I was worried that they would shoot me dead. That is why I had to follow them. Then they changed my name and address and I had to attend the training and I was sent to the frontline. They did like that." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000); he was 15 years old when he joined the Tatmadaw

Although the minimum enlistment age in Burma is 18, many children aged 13-17 are enlisted, and according to the deserters interviewed, some children as young as 9 are enlisted, both willingly and through coercion, into the Tatmadaw [see the above ‘Recruitment’ section]. There have also been reports of children being taken from their parents for what is described as a better study opportunity or into a group called the ‘Ye Nyunt youth’, only to later find themselves in a school run by the Army from which they are expected to join the Tatmadaw. Of the six SPDC soldiers interviewed for this report, one was 13 years old, one was 14 years old, two were 15 years old, and one was 17 years old when they joined the Army. One of the soldiers reported that of the 170 men in Light Infantry Battalion #549, forty to sixty of them were under the age of 18. This is a very high percentage, but is consistent with the proportion of underage deserters among those interviewed by KHRG in the past.

"The youngest is 11 or 12 years old. There are many soldiers younger than me. Right now, on November 8^th [2000], before I left, there were 15 more trainees who arrived at the singles barracks. I asked at least one child, ‘How old are you?’ He told me he was 10 years old. When I asked him if he had joined because he enjoyed it, he told me he was angry with his parents and went to sit on the Rangoon platform [at the train station] in the nighttime. A soldier called to him and told him he would give him pocket money. Then he could see his parents again. Then the soldier invited him to go and stay at his house freely. When he spoke to him like that, he followed. The next morning he [the boy] had to go to the Su Saung Yay for three days. He said, ‘Brother, I want to go back to my house.’ The soldier said to him, ‘Young brother, you are a soldier. You can’t go back.’ He told me that. He was a new soldier so I didn’t ask his name. He was a child, that is why I asked him why he joined. I had been in the Army for four years so I had experience. That is why I asked him." – "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"There are 9, 10 and 11 year old boys staying in the Army. When they are small like that, they are kept behind at the headquarters for one or two months. If there are not enough people in a company, they put two of them in each company. They have completed all the training, but they are young and the officers don’t send them out yet. They can’t carry their own backpacks yet. They keep them behind the lines and order them to do Pa Take [forced labour for the officers]. They have to dig the road, dig the earth, clear the grass and cut the brush. They order them to do everything. … There are 40, 50 or 60 people. There are not very many of older age. When they are 60 they have to leave the Army. There are some who are 50 or over 50 years old. Right now there is one man who is 60 years old. I don’t know if he has left the Army yet." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

The children attend the same basic training as everyone else. Once the children arrive at their assigned battalions, the younger ones who cannot yet carry their backpacks and guns are kept at the battalion camp for periods from a few months to a few years. If they are still very young (age 12 or below), the some officers don’t send them out on operations due to their youth and because they are useless in the field if they can’t even carry their own gun. One 15 year old child soldier interviewed by KHRG related how his company commander kept his gun for him while he was given only a hollow piece of bamboo and a stick to stand sentry at night. Although he had been taught how to use small arms in training, he wasn’t strong enough to pull back the bolt and chamber a round to fire his G3 assault rifle (the bolt on the G3 is notoriously hard to pull back). When his company moved from one camp to another he had to carry his company commander’s backpack as well as his own, but not a gun. Some child soldiers are ordered to stay behind and work on digging the roads, digging the ground, cutting the grass and bushes and taking care of the chickens, goats and cattle. A few of the children are sent to school. However, once the children are 12 or 13 they are sent out on operations. The young soldiers are sometimes used as punching bags by the older soldiers whenever they want. A 15 year old deserter stated that he was beaten with gun butts and slapped by his company commander, the NCO’s and the other soldiers because the two backpacks he was carrying were too heavy and he couldn’t keep up. In the end the beatings drove him to desert his unit.

"They also have children as young as 10 or 12 years old. They really need the manpower at the frontline on the battlefield so they arrest children. Some are too young so they keep them to take care of the goats, cows and chickens [at the camps]. They also have children that they send to school. It is because they need higher numbers of soldiers that they are arresting them like that. … The 10 and 11 year olds have to attend the training. If they couldn’t follow to the frontline and couldn’t carry their backpack and gun, they were ordered to go to the rear area and raise goats for one or two years." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"I stood sentry in the nighttime. They didn’t give me a weapon, just a hollow piece of bamboo to hit [to keep the time]. I had to hit it every fifteen minutes. … The company commander kept my gun. … They taught us about the G3 [assault rifle], MA1 [assault rifle; Chinese AK47], and 62 Sten [sub-machine gun]. I couldn’t pull back the G3 bolt myself [to chamber a round for firing], the NCO pulled it for me." – "Aung Myint Win" (M, 15), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #504, Papun District (Interview #6, 3/2001)

"They beat me in morning. I had to carry a very heavy backpack when we climbed the mountain and they didn’t let me take a rest. It was like that since we started walking from Kyauk Kyi. Whenever I couldn’t carry the heavy backpack they beat me. They all beat me. I got beaten when we went to the frontline. … I didn’t carry a gun, just two backpacks. They were the Company Commander’s backpack and mine. It weighed about 10½ pay tha [16.8 kgs. / 36.8 lbs.]. … If I couldn’t climb the mountain they beat me. They beat me with a gun and slapped my face. The company commander, T---, and the Sit Kyu both beat me. I don’t know how many people beat me or how many times. It was so I wouldn’t be late or slow and fall behind the other people." – "Aung Myint Win" (M, 15), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #504, Papun District (Interview #6, 3/2001)

Tatmadaw and the people, cooperate and crush all those harming the Union.
– Tatmadaw slogan

The SPDC divides Burma into ‘white’ areas, which are under complete SPDC military control; ‘brown’ areas, which are essentially under SPDC control but where resistance forces can occasionally penetrate; and ‘black’ areas, where there is regular armed resistance activity. ‘Black’ areas are often referred to as ‘frontline’ areas, though there is no fixed frontline; the situation is much more fluid than that, with the resistance operating as guerrilla units, holding de facto control over certain areas but getting out of the way (as do most of the villagers) when big SPDC columns pass through, then reappearing after the column is gone. The resistance forces use hit-and-run ambush tactics and landmines to harass the SPDC troops and restrict their movements and activities. Most SPDC officers would rather focus their activities on making money than fighting, so they and their soldiers prefer to stay in their camps or harass the villagers in the surrounding villages rather than going out to attack the resistance forces. SPDC officers often deliberately avoid areas where they think there will be resistance forces or landmines except when directly ordered to seek out the enemy, and when this happens they usually form large columns of 100 to 400 soldiers in order to protect themselves.

Soldiers spend much of their time in garrison at rear area camps. These large battalion-sized camps are spread throughout Burma in both resistance areas and in more ‘peaceful’ central Burma. The regional commands have battalion camps spread out throughout their areas. Those battalions near ‘frontline’ or ‘black’ areas rotate up to the frontlines every three months. Units stationed in less dangerous areas, like in central Burma, usually stay in garrison and rarely go to the frontline. Most of the Light Infantry Divisions and the Sa Ka Ka [Military Operations Commands] are based in central Burma, but their units are often sent out for operations at the frontlines. Battalion camps are often fairly large compounds and contain the battalion offices, a parade ground, barracks for the single soldiers and a separate area for the married soldiers and officers and their families. There are between 150 and 400 soldiers and officers in these camps and also their families. The battalion camps nearer the resistance areas also have bunkers, trenches, barbed wire and other defensive works. Although these camps are rarely attacked, they are in resistance areas. A support company stays at the camp and is responsible for supplies and payroll, even when the rest of the battalion is at the frontline. Some of these camps have been built after the villagers were forcibly evicted and their lands confiscated. Nabu Army Camp in southeastern Pa’an district is one example of this; in July 1995 Light Infantry Battalion #547 forcibly evicted the Muslim half of the village, as this 60-year-old Muslim farmer told KHRG at the time: "In the middle of July 1995, Kawkareik Township authorities arrived at our village and called one person from each family to attend a meeting. The authorities gave blank sheets of paper to each person and told them to sign it. After that, the Secretary of Kawkareik Township Law & Order Restoration Council said that the villagers’ farms and ricefields were all being taken to build a new Battalion camp for LIB 547. More than half of the village itself and many acres of ricefields were taken. The next day, they set up red flags and warning sign boards reading ‘Army Land, Do Not Enter’. Villagers receive no compensation for their land and houses. The villagers asked the Township LORC Secretary why their farms were taken and he said LIB 547 wanted the land." [Excerpted from "The Situation in Pa’an District" (KHRG #96-17, 15/5/96), Interview #3.] An Army deserter interviewed at about the same time added, "There are quite a lot of Muslims, but now some ran away and some moved because LIB 547 took exactly half of the village. The only Indian [Muslim] part remaining is right around the mosque. The road cut the village down the middle, and one side became the LIB 547 compound. Many good houses were demolished. The Army also took the ricefields for their own bean plantations, ‘bocate’ and ‘mart’ beans. Nabu village has about 700 families, and about 300 families lost their land." [Excerpted from "The Situation in Pa’an District" (KHRG #96-17, 15/5/96), Interview #4.] The battalion often sets up agriculture projects on the land surrounding the camps, using the forced labour of the villagers who once owned the land to farm it.

"LIB #549 is at the Nabu battalion camp. In the past the Indians were staying there [Burma-born people of Indian descent, most of them Muslims]. They [SLORC troops] destroyed the Indians’ Arabic school and drove out the Indians, then they built the car road. I saw the place. ... I know because one of the Saya Gyi [Sergeants] told me about it. He said, ‘The place where we are building the battalion camp is not our own land. The mothers and uncles [the villagers] cried because the land and paddy were confiscated from them.’ He told me, but he didn’t tell the other soldiers. He believed in me and told me about this so I thanked him." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000); he is referring to Nabu camp which was built in 1995.

Life begins for the soldiers with morning line up and roll call. After roll call, at 6 or 6:30 a.m., the soldiers are sent to work at Pa Take (a military word used to describe non-military labour done by the soldiers) on agricultural and construction projects, most of which are money making ventures for the officers. The soldiers are detailed to bake bricks in large brick kilns, which are sold by the officers for their own profit. They are also ordered to cut bamboo and wood to build buildings in the camp or to be sold by the officers. A deserter interviewed for this report who had served in central Burma reported that the soldiers are treated well in the camps in central Burma and that their salaries were occasionally increased because the SPDC was afraid of them deserting. Another reason for this better treatment may be because they are stationed much closer to the political heartland of Burma. Supply lines in central Burma are much stronger, and life in the Army camps in these ‘white areas’ is generally much better than life in ‘frontline’ camps. Although the rear area camps in the resistance areas are rarely attacked, life there is more difficult than in central Burma. The proximity to the ‘frontline’, the officers’ dislike of being stationed in the remote ethnic areas, and the generally more corrupt nature of these camps makes them much more tense. Soldiers are beaten and reviled by officers who come back to the camps drunk. A common punishment is to be made to walk like a crocodile or to have their backpacks filled with stones and then run with their gun until the officer says to stop. Soldiers are also sometimes put in the camp jail for major offences. Little fighting takes place around these camps, but death from illness is a danger. There are clinics in the camps, but there are not enough medicines and the medical personnel are undertrained. Soldiers who are sick are not always granted a reprieve from work. In some of the battalions they are still required to stand sentry. Although soldiers are treated for illnesses, some die from malaria and other diseases every month.

"They dealt nicely with them in the rear areas. In the rear areas they increased the salary. They did this because they were afraid the soldiers would desert and hurt the Army’s name. They dealt with us nicely. However, they were not friendly in the frontline. If the commander wants to punch you, he punches you. When the soldiers make a small mistake, the officers give punishment. Some soldiers fled." - "Soe Tint" (M, 18), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #10, Papun District (Interview #4, 11/2000)

"They punished us. They ordered us to walk like a crocodile [they had to crawl on the ground dragging their legs behind them] and to put stones in a pack, carry a gun and run. If they didn’t punish us like that, they put us in the jail." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"One night I couldn’t do sentry duty, so I told the Sergeant, ‘Saya, tonight I can’t do sentry duty. I’ll rest here and sleep.’ He said, ‘You can’t. You didn’t just become a soldier yesterday. Don’t come and talk to me like this.’ I said, ‘I’m sure that I can’t do sentry duty. Please understand me.’ He said, ‘You must. Even we Sergeants still have to stand sentry when we are sick.’ I couldn’t suffer it, but they wouldn’t believe me and they forced me. That night I got a fever, but I had to stand sentry." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

The married and single soldiers are allowed to mix. The married soldiers are dissatisfied because the officers always send them to the frontline and the men can’t take care of or feed their families. Some soldiers have told KHRG that with no money or food while their husbands are away on patrol or at the frontline, the wives of the rank and file can become easy prey for the officers; for example, this 21-year-old soldier interviewed in Tenasserim Division by KHRG in 1994: "At the base, when the soldiers went to the frontline the officers didn’t care about our families. Some of the officers slept with the wives of soldiers who were at the frontline. Some prostitutes from Mergui came and called the soldiers’ wives to become prostitutes like them. All of these things happened in 17 Battalion. The soldiers’ wives and children faced a lot of trouble whenever their husbands were away, and their husbands knew nothing about it." [Excerpted from "Comments by SLORC Army Defectors" (KHRG, 20/6/94).] Other soldiers have testified that officers sometimes offer money or food to the wives of soldiers to sleep with them. At some Army camps, while their husbands are away at the frontline the wives are forced to attend women soldier’s training. The women hate this, especially since they never joined the Army, they are simply civilians married to soldiers.

"Some soldiers who were married didn’t receive enough rations from the officers, and when they didn’t have enough there were problems. The officers sent the husbands to the frontline and kept their wives behind, and they forced the wives to take women soldier’s training. The women hated it. The men couldn’t take care of their families or feed them because they were always at the front line." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

In camp, the soldiers are fed one time in the morning and one time in the evening. The rations are sent to rear area camps between once a week and once a month. The rations were drastically cut in 1998 by the War Office in Rangoon, and orders were sent out to Battalions throughout the entire country to either produce much of their own food, or take it from the local people. As a result of this many units began farming their own fields to have enough food to eat. The land is usually confiscated from the villagers who are then used as forced labour to do most of the work on it; in many cases they are even forced to provide the seed for the crop without any compensation. The produce grown in these battalion fields is mostly sold for a profit by the officers. Officers and soldiers also force villagers to hand over their good rice in exchange for an equal quantity of the terrible quality Army ration rice. Even before the rations were cut back in 1998, the officers and quartermaster sergeants were already taking and selling many of them for personal profit, including fishpaste, salt, tinned milk, tinned meat, and rice, and the troops were told to get their food in the villages. The result of all of this is that there is often enough rice at the meals, but nothing much to go with it. The soldiers get bean soup and sometimes potatoes, but usually no meat. The soldiers are unable to complain. When they do, the officers tell them that because they are allotted an allowance of 5 Kyat’s worth of food per day, they only get 5 Kyat’s worth of food and must be content with that. Some of the married soldiers say they don’t receive enough rations for their families. The married soldiers eat separately with their families, while the single privates and NCO’s cook together in the same pot, but eat separately. The soldiers are responsible for cooking for the officers, but do not eat with the officers. The officers eat much better, because they hold back any good rations for themselves, and they have money to buy better food and meat or can demand it from the surrounding villages.

"They fed us one time in the morning and one time in the evening. They fed us enough rice, but there was not enough curry for one plate. The rations were sent each week. All the single men had to eat together. We all had to gather together and cook in the same pot. The married soldiers also got their rations each week, but they ate in their houses with their families. ... We had to cook and feed the commanders differently and separately from us. They ate good curries because they were officers. The soldiers had to eat bean soup and sometimes, potatoes. We wanted to complain, but couldn’t. They said, ‘You get 5 Kyat per day [as a food allowance]. Therefore you receive 5 Kyat [worth of rations]. You must eat only this.’" - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

The soldiers are allowed to read magazines and newspapers, although only those approved by the SPDC. Listening to the radio is not allowed unless it is to listen to music cassettes. In mid-2000, the soldiers were banned from listening to foreign radio broadcasts from shortwave stations like the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), VOA (Voice of America), RFA (Radio Free Asia) and DVB (Democratic Voice of Burma), which broadcast in Burmese and are the main sources of news for many people in Burma. The soldiers commented that they are not usually allowed enough free time to listen to the radio anyway. This policy is directed at keeping the soldiers ignorant of what is really going on in Burma, and preventing them from hearing any criticism of the Army [see ‘Feelings on Political and Social Change’ below]. Soldiers are officially allowed to write letters and to receive them, but the letters are usually destroyed by their officers. Letters sent to parents and family disappear because the officers and sergeants take them out of the mailboxes, read them and throw them away. Letters from home are also destroyed before reaching the soldiers. The soldiers are not told about this, but find out from their peers. The letters are destroyed out of the SPDC’s fear that the soldiers will learn what is actually going on in Burma outside the Army, or that their families, and therefore the general public, will hear about problems in the Army. There is also the fear that once the soldiers are able to make contact with their families, their desire to escape will become stronger. Soldiers are sometimes granted leave, but it is usually only the married soldiers. This is probably because the officers believe these soldiers will come back to the camp because their families are still there. There was previously a policy to allow one soldier leave after the one who had leave before him came back, but so many soldiers deserted while on leave that it is rarely granted anymore.

"They allowed radios, reading books, and magazines. They didn’t allow us to listen to the radio [they could only use it to listen to music cassettes]. When the Saya Gyi [sergeant] saw one radio, he asked, ‘What is that?’ I told him it was nothing and I turned on a cassette [he had been listening to the radio]. He said, ‘That isn’t true. Bring that radio to me.’ Then they kept it in a box. We couldn’t listen to it anymore." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"I don’t have a home so I didn’t write [his parents are deceased]. Some people wrote. Most of the people who wrote have deserted. They make contact and run away often, so if the soldiers write letters, the SPDC goes to look for the letter in the post and if they find it they take it and destroy it. Sometimes, if we gave it to the office [the Company office], it disappeared in the office. The letters did not arrive and disappeared. They made it disappear." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"[T]hey asked that anyone who wanted to go back must go and report [to the officers]. They will do it when we go to report. They will write a letter of recommendation. When someone had gone back, they would let another person from the battalion go back only when the first person returned. But the first person didn’t come back to the battalion and fled. Therefore, very few of us were given permission. They didn’t dare give permission. Many people fled. When we sent letters to our parents, none of the letters reached them. They [the officers] took them from the mailbox, read them and then threw them away. They didn’t let us read any of the letters from our parents. They disappeared." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"Yes, I heard a little bit sometimes. I didn’t listen to it too much. We had to work. They ordered us to work the whole day and it was never finished. Only the leaders talked about it. The battalion commander talked about it. If they talked, they didn’t talk to us. They talked about it to the lower officers and the Saya Gyi [sergeants]. They didn’t talk about it to the soldiers." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000) talking about discussing democracy or Aung San Suu Kyi.

"Then they sent us to the frontline at Ba Hine. I was with a company of 30 soldiers. They sent us with three days rations, but it took so long, nearly one month. We were hungry for rice because we didn’t have any more rations. When we didn’t have rations, we ate the pith of the banana tree trunks and other things. As for the officers, they brought noodle packs [packets of instant noodles made with boiled water]. For us soldiers there was nothing to eat. We just had to watch them eating." - "Thein Htay" (M, 26), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #340, Papun District (Interview #5, 11/2000)

The frontline camps are where the situation is the worst for the soldiers. The camps at the frontline are usually small, isolated outposts from which the soldiers are expected to patrol the surrounding countryside. Columns are formed out of one or more companies, and sometimes as large as a battalion or more, to march through the countryside. These operations are supposed to be for the purpose of seeking out and engaging the resistance forces, but more and more they are ordered to find and destroy fields and villages, and hunt down villagers hiding in the forest. The privates and NCO’s are put under tremendous pressure not only by being in a war situation where they could be ambushed or step on a landmine at any time, but also by being ordered to do things to civilians which they know are wrong, while knowing that they will be severely punished or executed for failing to carry out the order. Some units find themselves in combat situations quite often, while others only see combat a few times a year. One soldier said that his unit usually only saw action 4-8 times a year, and that 2 or 3 people are killed and 4 to 10 people wounded. As explained earlier, most SPDC units avoid direct fights with the armed resistance and prefer to focus their military operations against the unarmed villagers; so when clashes do occur, they are usually either planned ambushes by the resistance or accidental encounters. Most of the engagements are ambushes by a few dozen resistance troops against a Company-sized (100 troops or less) or smaller SPDC group, and the SPDC troops usually get the worst of it. Occasionally there are larger engagements, when resistance forces attack an SPDC camp or when an SPDC column attacks a resistance camp; though the latter is very rare now due to the mobile guerrilla tactics of the resistance forces. In these engagements, the Burmese soldiers are often ordered to charge headlong at the enemy positions. This tactic results in very high casualties among the Burmese soldiers. It also shows a lack of planning and tactical skill, and a lack of concern for the lives of their soldiers on the part of the officers. The rank and file soldiers can see this, and it only makes them resent their officers all the more. Operating in areas with a population which is entirely against them and always afraid of ambush, the fears of the soldiers are made even worse by the opposition’s increasing use of landmines. Facing a shortage of manpower and ammunition, groups like the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) are increasingly relying on landmines to harass SPDC columns and restrict their movements and activities. At present in Karen areas, more SPDC soldiers are wounded and killed by landmines than by combat. The soldiers must be afraid of these at all times and in all places. Medics are assigned to the units and they try to treat the wounded and get them evacuated, but the medicines they carry are usually inadequate and the distances that soldiers have to be carried before they arrive at a clinic are so long that many bleed to death. It is not unheard of for commanders to leave severely wounded men behind, and Tatmadaw soldiers have even told KHRG in the past of officers shooting their own wounded soldiers. As one SLORC deserter described it to KHRG in a 1994 interview, "Any of our own soldiers who were seriously wounded were killed. If it isn’t serious, if they can walk or if it’s easy to take them, then they’re taken back. If not, they’re killed. The company commander orders this. When I saw things like that happen I felt very sad. It’s a terrible fault. Our own soldiers, we must bring them back but we didn’t. It’s a crime. It’s like frog eating frog, fish eating fish." [Excerpted from "Testimony of SLORC Army Defectors" (KHRG, 7/8/94).]

"[A]t the most, battles occurred four, five or eight times each year. … There were only two or three people who died each year. There were also about 4, 5 or 10 people who got wounded." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"When we went on operations we saw landmines, but we didn’t plant them. We planted landmines when we were staying in the camp. We didn’t plant them when we went to the frontline. We saw the landmines from our enemies. We dug them out." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

During the operations, the soldiers are not given enough rations to complete the operation. When the columns pass through villages, the officers demand chickens and pigs from the villagers or just order the soldiers to catch and take them. The officers get priority on these animals and the soldiers don’t usually get a good chance to take any for themselves. Food is also a problem in the frontline camps since the officers are often still able to sell off the soldiers’ rations or horde them for themselves. The officers are able to demand food from the surrounding villages, but don’t usually allow the soldiers to do this. The result is that the starving soldiers steal the villagers’ chickens, livestock, vegetables and rice in order to eat. In areas where the columns are under orders to destroy the villagers’ rice stocks and livestock, the soldiers are only too happy to be able to loot the rice and get some meat from the slaughtered animals. At the frontline Army posts, rations are usually sent up from the rear camps once a month using the forced labour of villagers as carriers; but even here, the supply sergeants and officers sometimes hoard or sell off the rations. The officers demand that surrounding villages give vegetables and meat and sometimes order the soldiers to demand these things for them. The villagers’ attempts to escape these demands are met with threats and often physical punishment from the officers. Even those officers who seem indifferent back in the base camps often become tyrants in the frontlines. Soldiers are commonly punished for even the smallest mistakes by the officers. They are punched by the officers whenever the officers want to punch them. Soldiers are slapped by officers and NCO’s for not carrying out orders well enough. What is created is such an atmosphere of fear that the soldiers will do things to avoid punishment which they don’t really agree with. They will beat porters more when an officer passes by, torture villagers and even execute suspected rebels when ordered to by the officers.

"Sometimes they called us to go in an emergency and to enter and clear a village. They asked us to kill the chickens and pigs. As a group we did this, but I never did it alone. I killed one pig in Paw Hta village. There all the soldiers stole chickens. They also beat to death one cat. The old sergeant beat the cat." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

"When I went on an operation in Papun [district], one of the soldiers from Signals [the communications unit of the battalion] went down in the valley and saw an AK [AK-47 assault rifle]. Above the bank of the river there is a village and it was before we arrived at that village. They suspected a person we saw near there. When an officer saw the gun he suspected that man. Nearby there was a boy looking after some cows. ‘Where are you from?’ They asked the boy who the man was, but he didn’t know. They arrested the man and asked him, ‘Whose gun is this?’ They interrogated him and punched him. Later, when they couldn’t ask him anything else, they called the village head. He asked a soldier to go and call the village head. The village head said he had never seen this person. He also didn’t know what village the man was from. They asked him again and again, but they couldn’t get an answer. They asked through an interpreter because he couldn’t speak Burmese. He didn’t answer so the senior officer gave us an order, and we had to kill him ourselves. The one who ordered us was from our company and his name is Captain A---. He is the company commander and has two stars. They [the soldiers] took a mattock from the village, dug a hole and killed him. I saw it. I killed only this person. Three or four soldiers were there. Each soldier shot him two or three times. He was dead and we buried him there. … They couldn’t tell whether he was a villager or an enemy. They saw an AK, so they suspected him and killed him." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"Sometimes I had to beat them. The officers ordered us to beat them so we had to. None of the villagers died when we beat them." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"When they [the officers] arrived in a village, they demanded chicken and rice from the village headwoman. We saw it with our own eyes and didn’t agree with this. Once they got it from the village headwoman, they sent it to their section. There is a Company office and the officers are in charge of it. There are 6 or 7 or 8 officers living there. They take the good things for themselves, and the poor things like potatoes, they gave seven of them to each section. We have five or six soldiers in each section and we can’t eat enough with just seven potatoes. We complained, but they didn’t respond to us. We had to take the things they gave us, had to eat what they fed us and had to do what they forced us to do. The commander told me it is the orders of the Army. I didn’t say anything in reply because he is a higher officer than me and also older than me." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)

"I feel very happy that I have escaped from the ‘house arrest’. When we were staying with them they were ordering us to work the whole day in the hot sun. We were sweating and we had to work. When they came back they were drunk from alcohol and reviled us and they beat us." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

The SPDC often talks of the danger of dividing the Tatmadaw, but that divide has already occurred and is growing. The officers have created for themselves a separate class in society, using both the soldiers under them and the civilian population for their own personal benefit. They see the privileges given to them as their right as officers and not something which must be earned. They demand the loyalty and obedience of their soldiers and harsh punishments are given to those who disagree. This attitude of the officer corps has over the years alienated the soldiers under it. Morale and discipline have greatly suffered. Many of the soldiers desert as a direct result of abuse from their own officers. The privates do not feel much respect for their officers. Soldiers look at their officers and see that they are only interested in acquiring wealth for themselves and their families, often to the detriment of their troops.

Most of those who become SPDC soldiers have previously heard the SPDC propaganda painting the Army as a harmonious and united family and have seen soldiers lording it over the civilians, so even if they are afraid of combat and Army discipline, they at least believe that once in the Army they will be treated well by their commanders. However, they all say that in the training, if not sooner, they were quickly disabused of that notion by seeing the abuse of common soldiers by officers and NCO’s. The officers and NCO’s use systematic humiliation and abuse to keep the soldiers in line so that they can be used for their commanders’ personal benefit. In the field, most officers focus on enriching themselves as quickly as possible by extorting money and labour from the local civilian population, and by collecting money in lieu of forced labour. They also use their own soldiers for money-making projects in addition to their normal duties, whether baking bricks or growing cash crops. But the abuse of their own soldiers does not stop there. Most officers also steal half or more of the pay of the soldiers under them, usually in the form of deductions from their salaries, and they sell many of the rations intended for their soldiers and tell them to go and get their food in the villages. Not only do the villagers have to suffer the systematic demands of the officers and SPDC authorities, but the looting and abuse of hungry rank and file soldiers set loose on their villages to plunder in order to survive.

"There were people they called ‘Sit Kyu’ [‘C.Q.’, Chief Quartermaster; a position usually held by a sergeant or sergeant major] who were stealing the rice and rations, so we didn’t get enough food to eat. The higher-ups sent enough rations for the soldiers, but they took it bit by bit until we didn’t get enough food. When they cooked rice, they put soda in it. When they cooked bean curry, they put soda in it. When we first arrived the food was okay, but later people got gas in their intestines and oedema [symptomised by swelling all over the body]. Some got sick because of the food. One of the new recruits died." - "Saw Tha Ku" (M, 21), Private from Infantry Battalion #19, Papun District (Interview #3, 3/2000)

The result is a thoroughly undisciplined Army, with soldiers being abused by NCO’s and officers, and all levels preying out of control upon the civilian population. Soldiers and NCO’s are almost never punished for any abuse against civilians, only when they do something which intrudes on the privileges of the officers. The civilians have no one they can dare to complain to, nor do the soldiers. The Tatmadaw has rules whereby soldiers are supposed to be able to pass any problems they have up to the officers through their NCO’s, but instead the officers use the NCO’s to keep any problems out of their hearing by threatening and abusing the rank and file soldiers.

"When they couldn’t order me to do something, they slapped my cheek. The Saya and Saya Gyi beat me [Saya and Saya Gyi are usually used for teachers, but in the Army refer to corporals and sergeants respectively]. I don’t know their names because there were many and they transferred to another battalion." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

As a result, the soldiers feel that the officers have no idea about what is happening with their soldiers and sergeants under them. The soldiers have to solve their problems themselves. The officers eat separately from the soldiers and they eat well, while the soldiers get barely enough to eat. One deserter described how only three days’ rations were issued to his company for an operation which took almost a month. The soldiers were forced to eat the trunks of banana trees while the officers had instant noodles which they had brought along, and didn’t allow the soldiers to eat. On operations, the officers tell the privates to round up villagers for forced labour as porters and for other work, not to get wounded, and to try to capture guns for them. If the soldiers do manage to capture any guns, the officers then take them and present them to their superiors in the hope of promotion or other rewards. However, most guns are actually ‘captured’ by capturing and torturing village elders until their villagers can find a gun somewhere to hand over. Officers commonly slap soldiers across the face for not carrying out orders well enough. This makes the soldiers very angry, as their own parents have never slapped their faces like that. There are some officers who do believe in some sense of duty to their country, its people, and the soldiers under them, but these officers are very few. Most have been corrupted by the system.

"He didn’t watch or take care of us. The officers ate well. They didn’t know what was happening with the soldiers. They told us not to get wounded when a battle occurs, and to get things from the KNLA. To get guns for them." - "Aung Zaw Moe" (M, 19), Lance Corporal from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #2, 12/2000)

"The officers and the soldiers are divided in their living conditions. They are not friendly with us. They take us when we have to go on operations. They tell us to go carefully. They oppressed the soldiers." - "Thein Htay" (M, 26), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #340, Papun District (Interview #5, 11/2000)

Most of the loyalty of the officers to the regime is based on the impunity they are given to plunder the countryside in return for crushing any opposition. This is why the SPDC is so unwilling to take concrete steps against forced labour and other abuses; the regime realises that if it takes away the means by which the officers enrich themselves, and if it begins calling them to account for their abuses, it may begin losing the loyalty of the officer corps and a split in the Army could result. However, the SPDC has only considered the loyalty of its officers and has completely ignored the welfare of the rank and file soldiers, assuming that they can be beaten down and used like the civilian population. This could be a serious mistake, as no army which has ignored the well being of its rank and file so blatantly has ever been successful for long.

"The attitude of the battalion commander who has arrived now is that as long as his family is living comfortably he doesn’t care about anything. He allows us soldiers to live as we like. He is a battalion commander who doesn’t look out for the benefit of many people, but only looks out for his own benefit. The officers who are staying in the battalion camp are working hard for their families to be comfortable. They don’t know what is happening to the soldiers and Saya Gyi [sergeants] who are under them. If we have a problem, we are supposed to send the news to the Saya Gyi, and the Saya Gyi sends the news on to the officers, but we couldn’t do that. We had to clear the problem ourselves, and the company commanders stay as though they don’t know." - "Tin Aung Win" (M, 17), Private from Light Infantry Battalion #549, Pa’an District (Interview #1, 12/2000)